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The Effect of Government Involvement on Chinese
Firms’ Corporate Entrepreneurial Activities:
The Case of Chinese Automobile Industry
Grace Chun Guo
Crystal X. Jiang
Qin Yang

I

n recent decades many emerging markets (EMFs) have
undertaken entrepreneurial transformations to adapt to
institutional transition and industrial change. Corporate
entrepreneurship (CE) provided EMFs viable ways to revitalize,
reconfigure, and transform successfully with the dynamic
environment. Although previous research examined
government roles on EMFs’ CE activities, little is known about
the mechanisms of how government exerts influence on
CE activities. To fully understand CE of EMFs, we propose a
stage model to explore specific roles governments play that
affect CE activities over time. In particular, we investigate how
governments’ grabbing hand, helping hand, and invisible
hand roles affected Chinese auto firms’ CE activities at
different stages from 1980 to 2016. Government involvement
is summarized and the advantages and disadvantages of
these roles are analyzed.
Keywords: corporate entrepreneurship; government
roles; innovation; venturing; emerging market; Chinese
automobile industry
Existing research has extensively examined how
emerging market firms (EMFs) have grown and become
important players in world business (e.g., Jiang et al., 2016;
Kotabe, Jiang, and Murray, 2017; Li and Kozhikode, 2008;
Mathews, 2006). In particular, EMFs have undertaken
entrepreneurial transformations to adapt to institutional
transition and industrial change (Yiu and Lau, 2008).
Corporate entrepreneurship (CE) provided EMFs viable
ways to revitalize, reconfigure, and transform successfully
with external environment (e.g., Zahra, Ireland, Gutierrez,
and Hitt, 2000). CE activities such as innovation, strategic
renewal, and corporate venturing (Covin and Slevin, 1991)
are critical for EMFs to venture internationally (Wang, Hong,
Kafourors, and Wright, 2012; Yiu, Lau, and Bruton, 2007) and
gain competitive advantages in fierce domestic and global
competition.

6

A firm’s ability to engage in CE is not only determined
by its available resources (Covin and Slevin, 1991) and
dynamic capabilities (Zahra and George, 2002), but also
by its embedded institutional environments. Institutional
environments can influence firms’ strategic activities
(Kotabe et al., 2017) and can shape the nature and level
of innovation in a country (Busenitz, Gomez, and Spencer,
2000). Among institutional forces, government plays
important roles in fostering entrepreneurial activities
(Minniti, 2008) through initiating policies, providing support,
and regulating industrial development (Kotabe et al., 2017).
EMFs differ from their counterparts in developed
countries in their lack of valuable resources and
capabilities (Yiu and Lau, 2008). To address their resources
insufficiency, EMFs are found to rely on preferential
treatment from the government to achieve business
success (Luo, 2000). Governments could be involved in
providing entrepreneurial opportunities for EMFs to access
valuable resources and to enhance firm capabilities. As
such, there are notable differences between EMFs and
developed market firms (DMFs) in conducting CE activities
(Kotabe et al., 2017).
Although previous research examined that the
fundamental question of whether government policies
have positive effect on entrepreneurial activities (Minniti,
2008), little is known about how governments matter in
EMFs’ CE activities. Drawing on previous models (Frye and
Shleifer’s 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 2002) of governments’
roles, we propose the following two research questions
to examine government’s involvement in promoting
CE activities in transition economies. First, what roles do
governments play in enabling and stimulating firms’ CE
in emerging economies? Second, what is the impact of
government involvement on important CE outcomes,
namely EMFs’ innovation, strategic renewal, and corporate
venturing? We adopted a case study approach (Eisenhardt,
1989; Yin, 1994) to our inquiry. We chose the automobile
industry in China as our research context because China

NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2017

7

New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 20 [2017], No. 1, Art. 5

has become the world’s largest and fastest-growing
emerging economy and its automobile industry has been
the largest in the world measured by unit production
since 2008. Under the strong influence of the government,
most Chinese automobile enterprises have undergone an
entrepreneurial transformation in order to compete locally
and globally, especially after China’s entry into the World
Trade Organization (Peng, 2003; Tan, 2007).
In this article, we provide a literature review of CE and
describe government’s roles in transition economies based
on Frye and Shleifer’s (1997) and Shleifer and Vishny (2002).
We then analyze Chinese government’s involvement and
roles in the development of the automobile industry and
the CE activities of auto companies between the early
1980s to 2016. Lastly, we discuss outcomes of the Chinese
government’s involvement and provide implications for
theory and practice.

Theoretical Background
Corporate Entrepreneurship (CE)
CE is defined in various ways in the entrepreneurship
research. CE was viewed as the rebirth of organization
through a renewal (Guth and Ginsberg, 1990). Zahra (1995,
1996) defines CE as a process of creating new businesses
or the strategic renewal of an existing business to improve
profitability and competitive advantages. CE requires firms
to engage in three distinct but related activities: innovation,
strategic renewal, and cooperate venturing (Zahra,
1996). First, innovation requires firms to develop cultures,
processes, and structures to support continuous new
product launches in its current markets as well as introduce
existing products into new markets (Covin and Miles, 1999).
Second, CE also embodies renewal activities that
enhance an enterprise’s ability to compete and take risks,
with or without the creation of new businesses. Strategic
renewal refers to the “revitalization of the company’s
operations by changing the scope of its business, its
competitive approach, or both” (Zahra, 1996: 1715). These
renewal activities may include opportunity identification
and exploitation as well as creating and sustaining a
competitive advantage through strategic renewal and
business model reconstruction. It can also include
organizational rejuvenation—a firm’s ability to improve its
internal processes, structures, and capabilities, to better
execute strategies and often involves administrative
innovations in human resource management (Covin and
Miles, 1999). Lastly, strategic renewal may also involve
domain redefinition—activities involving the creation of

new product market position that competitors have not
recognized or exploited (Covin and Miles, 1999). According
to Covin and Miles (1999), the focus of domain redefinition
is exploring for what is possible rather than exploiting what
is currently available.
Third, corporate venturing refers to activities that “seek
to generate new businesses for the corporation in which
it resides through the establishment of external or internal
corporate ventures” (Von Hippel, 1977: 163). Corporate
venturing can be divided into internal and external venturing
(Phan, Wright, Ucbasaran, and Tan, 2009). Internal corporate
venturing involves the creation of new businesses that reside
within the corporate structure and preexisting organization
structures may accommodate these new ventures or newly
created organizational entities. External corporate venturing
involves investing in young, early growth-stage businesses
created by external parties through corporate venture capital,
licensing, acquisitions, and joint ventures.
In short, CE requires organizations to engage in
activities that continuously extend their domain of
competence and respond to risks and opportunities
through resource configuration and capability
development to meet changing customer demands
and competitor strategies (Guo et al., 2014). However, CE
activities do not occur in a vacuum and are under the
influence of institutional environments. National culture
(Hayton, George, and Zahra, 2002), accepted industry
norms and rules of engagement in competition (Covin
and Miles, 1999), and public policies as well as government
involvement (Wang et al., 2012) can exert strong influence
on firms’ ability and willingness to engage in CE activities.
Among institutional forces, government plays important
roles in fostering entrepreneurial activities (Minniti, 2008).
This is especially the case for firms in emerging economies
where institutional mechanisms are found to complement
firms’ activities (Kotabe et al., 2017) when their markets
have not reached the technological frontier (Mahmood
and Rufin, 2005) and EMFs have not fully developed their
competitive advantages to compete with their counterparts
from developed countries (Kotabe et al., 2017).
The following section introduces the stage models
of government roles in transition economies based on
Shleifer and Vishny (2002) and provides an analysis of
government’s involvement in and impact on CE activities
and industry development of the Chinese automobile
industry from the early 1980s to 2016.
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Government Roles and Institutional Influence
According to Shleifer and Vishny (2002), the impact of
governments on entrepreneurial activities in transition
economies can be described as the invisible hand, the
helping hand, and the grabbing hand models. Under
the invisible hand model, government restricts itself
to providing basic public goods, such as contract
enforcement, law and order, and some regulations.
Governments adopting invisible hands are generally
well organized, benevolent, and refrain from making
allocative decisions. Under the helping hand model,
government is actively involved in promoting economic
activities, establishing industry policies, and often has
close ties to entrepreneurs. In this model, government
has strong arbitrative power and leaves little room for the
legal framework. Lastly under the grabbing hand model,
government is considered interventionists; it remains
largely independent of courses and is empowered to
impose a variety of regulations on businesses.
An institution-based view suggests that firms’ strategic
choices are the outcome of the interaction between
organizations and institutions. While industry conditions,
firm resources, and capabilities can drive strategic choices,
formal and informal constraints of a particular institutional
environment can also exert strong influence. Based on
Kostova’s (1997) three-dimensional institutional profile,
a country’s level of entrepreneurship is determined by
government policies (regulatory dimension), shared
knowledge to establish new business (cognitive dimension),
and value system (normative dimension). Although
government’s influence on entrepreneurial activities is
mainly through public policies and regulations, or coercive
isomorphism in DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) term, we
speculate that governments, especially those in transition
economies, can also shape the value system by imposing
normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), which
requires firms to abide by the norms or rules established
by the government for a specific profession or industry.
In addition, it is possible that governments in transition
economies, to address their political goals, can play an active
role in issuing favorable policies and allocating resources to
help construct a shared knowledge base for firms to engage
in entrepreneurial activities. In the next section, we apply
Frye and Shleifer (1997)’s framework and provide an analysis
of the Chinese government’s involvement and institutional
influence in reshaping the automobile industry.

8

Chinese Automobile Industry and
Government Involvement
Governments of a few major emerging economies, including
Brazil, India, and China, have successfully developed a viable
national automotive industry as one of the national economic
pillars (Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck, 2010). Even in these
countries, however, local automobile firms are still relatively
weak, and multinational firms will continue to dominate the
domestic industry for a long time (Chang, 2016; Guo, et al.,
2014). The difficulty of developing competitive automobile
enterprises in emerging economies is attributed to unique
institutional factors (e.g., heavy government regulations and
interventions in the automotive industry), an underdeveloped
supplier industry, underdeveloped intellectual property rights
(IPR) environment (Jiang, et al., 2011), and price-sensitive
domestic markets (Guo, et al. 2014)
The case of the Chinse automobile industry follows
the general development trajectory experienced by those
in other emerging economies. China surpassed the United
States in production of vehicles in 2008 (Guo, et al., 2014),
and the Chinese government succeeded in creating
the world’s largest automobile market with 24.5 million
units in 2015 (Chang, 2016). From 2000 to 2015, China’s
market share of auto production sextupled. In particular,
the market share at the worldwide auto production
almost doubled from 12 percent in 2007 to 23 percent in
2010 (Quest Trend Magazine). The two graphs in Figure 1
illustrate the growth trend of China’s auto industry.

Initiation Stage (Early 1980s to Late 1990s)
In the early 1980s, recognizing the lack of capital and
technological expertise of the local automobile makers,
Chinese political leaders established the country’s
passenger car production and an automotive supply chain.
In 1985, the government named the automobile industry
as one of its “pillar” industries (Roberto, Guo, and Jiang,
2011). To achieve these goals, the government encouraged
foreign direct investment and established laws that
forced international automakers into joint venture (JV)
arrangements. In 1994, the government developed the
China Automotive Industry Policy, which, for the first
time, set clear 50–50 JV requirements between Chinese
automakers and their foreign partners. To encourage
foreign direct investment (FDI), the government provided
favorable policies, such as a two-year tax exemption and a
three-year tax reduction for Sino-foreign firms.
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Figure 1. Growth Trend of China’s Auto Industry.
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The expectation behind such an arrangement was
that Chinese automakers would acquire technology and
know-how from their foreign partners, usually leading
international automakers. It can also improve local supply
industry with requirements of high rates of local content
(the percentage of auto parts purchased from local
suppliers in an assembly) (Sun, Mellahi, and Thun, 2010).
In exchange, foreign partners would gain access to the
vast Chinese car market. Such opportunities were greatly
welcomed by international automakers as the passenger
car markets in the industrialized market were approaching
saturation during that time (Chang, 2016). In addition,
the Chinese government believed that the 50–50 JV
arrangement would also prevent foreign automakers from
dominating the Chinese market. Even today, establishing
a wholly foreign-owned automobile enterprise in China
is prohibited (Chang, 2016). Consequently, firms such
as Volkswagen, Citroën, General Motors, and Ford all
partnered with domestic automakers. By the end of 1997,
China had about 500 FDI-involved automobile firms;
among these, 80 were assembly JVs and 410 were auto
parts JVs (Sit and Liu, 2000).
It is evident that during this early development stage,
the Chinese government adopted the grabbing hand
model. For instance, “in 1988, the government proposed a
strategy of supporting ‘three majors and three minors’—
with First Automobile Works (FAW), Second Automobile
Works (SAW), and Shanghai Automotive Industry
Corporation (SAIC) named as the three majors, and Beijing,
Tianjin, and Guangzhou firms as the three minors—to
limit the total number of firms, and provide a high degree
of protection.” (Chu, 2011: 1243). In addition, once the
Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Corporation (SVW) was
formed, the Shanghai government listed it as a “pillar firm” in
its development plan and provided preferential treatment
in taxation, foreign loans, exchange rates, and materials
procurement (Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman, 2006).
In addition, the government imposed coercive
pressure on Chinese and foreign automakers to jumpstart
the national automobile industry by imposing the 50–50
JV arrangement and banning foreign-owned automobile
enterprises in China. Despite the good intention, JV
partnerships are structured in a way that the Chinese firm
is mainly responsible for auto assembly operations and
the foreign partner is in charge of new car designs and
branding (Chang, 2016). In addition, Chinese automakers
did not form exclusive relationships with their foreign

10

partners. For example, SAIC had formed multiple joint
ventures, including Shanghai-Volkswagen, ShanghaiGeneral Motors, among others. Due to the nature of such
non-exclusive partnerships and to the concerns about
the country’s inadequate enforcement and enactment of
intellectual property protection, foreign automakers were
reluctant to share their full knowledge with their Chinese
partners (Guo et al., 2014; Roberto et al., 2011).
Furthermore, hierarchical control rather than market
relations determined the choices of suppliers. For example,
the Shanghai government formed a localization office, which
charged local suppliers’ products, financing, technology
adopted or imported. And the localization office requested
SVW to source from these firms (Sun et al., 2010). Further, high
tariffs and entry restrictions enabled the JVs to price cars high
and obtain high profits (Chu, 2011). Although such a strong
grabbing hand allowed rapid development of the Chinese
automakers and enabled them to acquire manufacturing
capabilities in a relatively short period of time, they have
not gained full access to closely guarded cutting-edge
technologies and R&D.
In short, during the period of early development, the
Chinese government’s strong grabbing hand, on the one
hand, allowed the weak Chinese automakers to pursue CE
transformation through corporate venturing by entering
the 50–50 JV arrangement with their foreign partners. On
the other hand, a high level of regulative pressure and the
nature of the JV arrangement also constrained Chinese
automakers’ ability to develop marketing capabilities as
well as new product development and independent
innovation capabilities.

Rapid Development Stage (Late 1990s to 2005)
Starting in the late 1990s, the institutional environment in
China experienced rapid and significant changes. Three
changes relevant to the automobile industry development
were the increasing power of industry ministries and local
(e.g., provincial) governments due to the gradual removal
of central planning mechanisms (Guo et al., 2014), China’s
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, and
the rising household income along with improved road and
highway infrastructure in China. Previously auto consumers
were mainly institutions and taxi companies. However,
the increase of individual wealth fostered a segment with
price-sensitive consumers. Private auto ownership increased
around 22 percent annually from 1996 to 2005 (Chu, 2011).
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The more powerful industry ministries and local
governments gave birth to large automobile conglomerates
such as FAW and SAIC (Sit and Liu, 2000) as well as local
government-owned automakers such as Chery Auto. Today
there are a number of regional auto manufacturing hubs
in northern China, the central coast around Shanghai,
southern China, and western China (Chang, 2016). Although
these local governments provided strong support, which
has been crucial to the success of JVs with operations in
their region, they made it difficult for JV to be successful
in other regional markets (Chang, 2016). For instance, in
Shanghai, one will find more cars manufactured by SAIC’s
joint ventures with GM and Volkswagen, but many fewer
cars by Ford or Toyota whose JV operations are in northern
and southwestern China (Chang, 2016). In addition, the
Shanghai municipal government required that city taxis
be the Santana model from SVW. In 1996, the Shanghai
government banned cars with engine capacity lower than
1.6 liters to exclude Xiali cars (produced in Tianjin). In 1998,
it levied an extra $10,000 license fees on Citroën cars (ZX/
Fukang) made in Hubei province, and a lower license tax to
Santana buyers (Sun et al., 2010).
Second, the growth rate of the Chinese auto industry
accelerated rapidly after the country’s entry into the WTO
in 2001, which encouraged more foreign automakers in
the country (Roberto et al., 2011) and exposed domestic
automakers to fierce competition (Guo et al., 2014).
Lastly, rapid national economic growth, rising household
incomes, and the development of the highway and road
infrastructure throughout China also fueled consumer
demand for automobiles and fierce development of the
Chinese automobile industry. In 2009, China produced
10.38 million passenger cars, surpassing the United States
as the world’s largest manufacturer. The rising domestic
demand also gave birth to several independent automakers.
These newcomers to the industry and are not state-owned
enterprises. The most well-known independent automakers
in China are BYD Auto and Geely Auto.
Industry growth has been driven by rising domestic
demand and encouraged by supportive government policies.
During the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, the Chinese
government implemented generous incentives to drive
growth in the Chinese market. The stimulus package initially
applied only to small car models of engines below 1.6 liters,
but later in 2010 was expanded to include all passenger cars.
Incentives by the central government effectively encouraged
auto purchases despite the global economic downturn

(Roberto et al., 2011). And, auto distribution networks were
established hierarchically. For example, SVW vehicles flowed
from manufacturers to regional, provincial, municipal sales
agents, and then to retailers.
During the rapid development period, we believe the
Chinese government scaled back its regulative influence
and adopted the helping hand model, encouraging
Chinese auto firms to further their CE initiatives especially
through continuous strategy renewal. The Chinese
government did not exert strong coercive pressure
on auto firms but was actively involved in improving
overall road construction and highway infrastructure as
well as providing economic incentives to ensure auto
purchases during the global financial crisis. Government
at the central and the local levels also provided key
support for Chinese automakers’ strategic renewal. For
example, in our recent case study of Chang’an (Guo, et
al., 2014), one of China’s leading automakers, we found
that Chang’an was able to engage in a series of strategic
renewal activities by participating in national technology
development projects and by applying for national
innovation funds for improving R&D capabilities (e.g.,
upgrading R&D facilities and equipment), developing new
products (e.g., providing more financial support for lab
experiments), and conducting new technology research
(e.g., providing more financial support for international
collaboration). Compared with the grabbing hand model,
we consider the helping hand model effective during the
rapid industry growth stage as most automakers during
this period acquired state-of-the-art manufacturing
capabilities from their foreign partners and were able to
manufacture their own brands and those of their foreign
partners. Most Chinese automakers were in the process
of exploiting the existing and identifying new sources of
competitive advantages to face the fierce competition
especially after China’s entry into WTO. However, as
discussed earlier, the involvement of local government in
protecting the leading regional automakers has created a
scattered and fragmented Chinese auto industry.

Recent Transformation Stage (2006–Present)
The year 2006 marks the beginning of the new industry
growth stage, which we term “recent transformation.” In
the 11th Five Year Plan (FYP) (2006–2010), the government
for the first time used the term “indigenous brands” and
called for auto production capacity of at least 2 million
vehicles—50 percent from manufacturing indigenous
brands and only 10 percent would be exported (Chang,
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2016). It is also evident in the 11th FYP that Chinese
automakers would not be judged on their ability to
develop Chinese intellectual property that would relieve
reliance on foreign technology (Chang, 2016).
Indeed, high oil prices, air pollution, and China’s
commitment to reduce carbon emissions have led the
government to prioritize development of the energy
vehicle industry. Lawmakers have introduced policies and
incentives to support development of new energy vehicles
(NEVs) including electric (hybrid, plug-in, and battery), fuel
cell, and hydrogen powered (APCO Worldwide Report). In
2009, the Chinese government initiated pilot programs
in 13 cities (later expanded to 20 cities) for NEVs used for
public service purposes such as public transition, taxis,
and official business. The programs provided subsidies for
public transportation (e.g., USD 62,969 for hybrid buses)
and to support the purchase of NEVs, translating into a
price reduction for consumers. In addition, from 2010 to
2020, the central government plans to allocate more than
USD 15 billion to support (1) R&D and industrialization of
energy-efficient and new energy cars; (2) development
of NEV pilot projects; (3) promotion of hybrid electric
vehicles and other energy-saving cars; (4) development of
key components; and (5) development of electric vehicle
infrastructures in the pilot cities. It projected that three
to five key automakers will emerge with their combined
market share exceeding 60 percent. The plan also predicts
5 million NEVs will be produced, enabling China to
become the leading producer of NEVs by 2020 (APCO
Worldwide Report).
In addition to NEVs, the Chinese government has
also been heavily promoting vehicle connectivity (e.g.,
between driver and vehicle, vehicles and transportation
systems, Internet, mobile networks, and satellites) (Chang,
2016). The Internet-enabled car industry was identified
by the government as a new opportunity for domestic
automakers to become leaders in the new industry
and again reduce their reliance on foreign technology.
As a result, most of China’s leading automakers have
announced investments in Internet-enabled cars.
The government continues to adopt the helping hand
model and provides various incentives to promote NEVs,
including direct subsidies to automakers that produce
NEVs, subsidies to local government who purchases green
fleets, and tax breaks and free registration for consumers
(Chang, 2016). In fact, since the 2009 Automotive Industry
Readjustment and Revitalization Plan, the government did
12

not announce a sector-specific policy, an indicator that the
government is generally satisfied with the auto industry’s
growth (Chang, 2016). As discussed earlier, government’s
attention has shifted to specific areas of the auto industry
and has made these its top priorities. Nevertheless, the
government did exert normative pressure on Chinese
auto firms and shaped cognitive understanding of the
importance of cultivating independent innovation and
new product development capabilities for Chinese
automakers to gain leading positions and reduce reliance
on foreign technologies in new areas such as NEVs and
Internet-enabled cars.
Following these government initiatives, Chinese auto
firms, for example, Chang’an in our recent case study
(Guo et al., 2014), identified building an independent
innovation system as an important entrepreneurial
endeavor. The innovation systems were built to develop
core technologies, reconfigure available resources, and
eventually new products—important CE transformation
through innovation and continuous strategic renewal. To
support these CE initiatives, most leading Chinese auto
firms also engaged in organizational rejuvenation activities
by cultivating strong, innovation-supportive corporate
cultures and establishing a compatible human resources
management (HRM) system.

Implications and Conclusion
Our analysis based on the case study of the Chinese auto
firms and auto industry’s transformation has answered two
research questions raised at the beginning of this editorial:
(1) what roles can governments play in enabling and
stimulating firms’ CE in emerging economies and (2) what
is the impact of government involvement on important
CE outcomes, namely EMFs’ innovation, strategic renewal,
and corporate venturing? It is evident in our analysis that
the Chinese government played different roles at different
stages. During the initiation stage, government adopted
a strong grabbing hand to jumpstart the auto industry
and initiated domestic automakers’ CE transformation
through corporate venturing by forcing the 50–50 JV
partnership arrangement between Chinese and foreign
automakers. The impact of the grabbling hand model
was demonstrated in the Chinese automakers’ improved
manufacturing capabilities but it also constrained their
ability to acquire core technologies as well as marketing
and R&D capabilities, all of which are crucial for innovation
and NPD. During the rapid development and recent
transformation periods, the government adopted a
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helping hand model to provide favorable economic
incentives, policies, as well as improve the overall
infrastructure and FDI investment environment to promote
Chinese automakers’ CE transformation through strategic
renewal and innovation in NEVs and Internet-enabled
cars. The helping hand was also effective in establishing
industry norms based on government expectations and in
creating a value system to favor development of NEVs and
Internet-enabled cars.
In the Western CE literature, for instance, Dess et al.
(2003), stress the different CE roles of management at
multiple levels of the organization and emphasize the role
of top management leadership in CE. We suggest that
the argument can be extended to examine the different
roles of governments in initiating, enabling, and shaping
the CE transformation of firms in emerging economies.
It is evident that governments can serve an important

function in assisting and guiding top managers of EMFs
in identifying entrepreneurial opportunities, suggesting
innovative ideas and initiatives, offering financial and
political support for exploiting opportunities identified
by CE programs, supporting investment in building the
EMFs’ capabilities and sustained competitive advantages.
We believe the unique institutional compositions of the
emerging markets may require different research topics
that are currently underexamined in the mainstream CE
literature. To achieve this goal and to develop a better
understanding of CE-related issues, especially those
pertinent in emerging markets, we encourage all interested
scholars to submit relevant scholarly work to our special
issue on “Corporate Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets.”
After all, we need to address the critical questions of how
emerging markets are reshaping globalization.
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To Be or Not to Be an Ethnic Firm:
An Analysis of Identity Strategies in Immigrant-owned Organizations
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Shruti Sardesmukh
Norma Juma

I

mmigrant groups often pursue entrepreneurial
endeavors in their new home country. Even though
both immigrant entrepreneurship and organizational
identity have received scholarly attention, there has been
little systematic exploration of identity strategies pursued by
immigrant-owned organizations. In this article, we develop a
theoretical framework that draws on the concepts of liability
of foreignness and social identity theory in the context of
immigrant entrepreneurship. Our framework explores how
immigrant entrepreneurs may negotiate identities for their
firms through the development of specific identity strategies
that confirm or underplay their national/ethnic identities in
order to survive in their immediate environment. We develop
a model that shows how these confirmations or underplaying
strategies work both for firms that have an individualistic
entrepreneurial orientation, as well as those with a collective/
associative entrepreneurial orientation. We also suggest two
contextual moderators to this relationship: (1) the image
of the founder’s country of origin, and (2) the presence of
immigrant networks in the host country, which may alter the
effectiveness of identity strategies in terms of organizational
mortality outcomes.
Keywords: immigrant entrepreneurship; social identity;
liability of foreignness; immigrant founder
Immigration, which influences the demographics,
economies, and politics of countries, has emerged as a key
issue in the world. In 2013, 13% of the U.S. population was
from another country, consisting of approximately 25% firstor second-generation immigrants (Migration Policy Institute,
2015). Between 1993 and 2014, the immigrant population
in UK more than doubled, from 3.8 million in 1993 to 8.3
million in 2014 (The Migrant Observatory, 2015). In spite of
the ubiquity of immigration, even highly skilled immigrants
face immense obstacles obtaining employment in new
environments (Wald, 2004). Many immigrants often resort to
self-employment or entrepreneurial activities to overcome
the hurdles of gaining employment. In fact, immigrants
have been an important driving force behind the growth

of American cities (Light, 2002). They have also been
overrepresented in the entrepreneurial sector in Australia
(Collins, 2003) and Europe (Rath & Kloosterman, 2000),
often seen as “a powerful economic force” (Baycan-Levent &
Nijkamp, 2009). Despite the high rates of entrepreneurship
among immigrant groups, firms started by immigrants also
experience specific hurdles in the host country (Bates, 1997).
While most startups suffer from the liabilities of
smallness and of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965), firms
founded by immigrant entrepreneurs encounter additional
challenges that emerge from the founders’ newness to the
country in which they operate. These challenges include
the competitive disadvantage due to additional costs of
operating in a foreign market (Hymer 1976; Kindleberger,
1969). We use the definition of immigrant entrepreneurship
developed by Chaganti and coauthors, which is “selfemployment efforts by individuals that voluntarily
migrate to a different country and engage in business
ownership” (Chaganti et al., 2007). The challenges faced by
immigrant firms are similar to the disadvantages faced by
foreign-owned firms due to their foreignness relative to
domestic firms (Hymer, 1976; Kindleberger, 1969; Vernon,
1977; Zaheer, 1995). Zaheer (1995, p. 342) referred to this
phenomenon as the “liability of foreignness,” defining it as
“the additional costs of doing business abroad that results
in a competitive disadvantage for an MNE (multinational
enterprise) subunit.” These disadvantages can hinder
the performance, and even the survival, of immigrant
entrepreneurs’ ventures, leading to their mortality. The
literature has also shown that immigrant entrepreneurs
undertake different strategies, which may affect firm
performance (Ndofor & Priem, 2011); yet, we do not have
a nuanced understanding of how social identity may
influence the strategies of these ventures.
We use the lens of social identity theory (SIT) to
explore how immigrant entrepreneurial firms deal with
their foreign identities. For example, migrant firms may
emphasize their ethnic identity (enclave businesses) or
shed their ethnic identity the way Silicon Valley migrant
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ventures did (Zhou, 2004). Specifically, we seek to answer
the questions of how foreign founders either emphasize
or underplay their foreignness, and how that may relate
to their chances of survival. We argue that immigrant
firms use different identity strategies to overcome the
liability of foreignness, aiming to increase their chances
of persevering. Fauchart and Gruber (2011) have shown
how founders’ identities are crucial for determining the
actions and behaviors of the firms, especially at the initial
stages of the lifecycle of the firm. We argue, however, that
this context for entrepreneurial action and entrepreneurial
identity is extremely different when the founder is an
immigrant. Therefore, we explore the various ways that
this immigrant identity of entrepreneurs unfolds in their
firms. Nonetheless, we understand that not all immigrant
entrepreneurs have the same experiences or are received
in similar ways in the host country (Turner, et al., 1987).
The industry they operate in, as well as the networks they
have in the home and host countries, could be some
of the many factors that can impact the experiences of
immigrant entrepreneurs’ and the way they negotiate
their foreign identities. As such, we also investigate
how different contextual moderators could alter the
impact of identity strategies on survival outcomes. This
is important because these identity strategies determine
the way the firms try to construct their narratives in
society and establish a sense of legitimacy for their
operations in the world. With rising levels of immigration,
and entrepreneurship being one of the biggest areas
of immigrant economic engagement, this has become
a timely topic for policy makers and researchers alike
(Collins, 2003; Light 2002; Aliaga-Isla & Rialp, 2013).
While immigrant entrepreneurship literature has
long explored factors related to human and social
capital (Aliaga-Isla & Rialp, 2013), there is little research
on understanding how entrepreneurs use identity
strategies in their ventures to mitigate the organizational
morality issues related to liability of foreignness.
Addressing Aliaga-Isla and Rialp’s (2013) call for research
to investigate theories from management to understand
firm performance, we develop a conceptual model of
how identity strategies are categorized to mitigate such
organizational mortality and identify moderators to this
relationship. By doing this, we contribute to the immigrant
entrepreneurship literature by extending identity theory
into this domain. We also contribute to the identity theory
literature by developing a model in which individuals may
develop identity strategies for ventures they have created.
18

Literature Review
Liability of Foreignness for Immigrant Firms
In the MNE literature, liability of foreignness is associated
with a competitive disadvantage to an MNE subunit
because of the costs of doing business abroad (Hymer,
1976; Kindleberger, 1969). These costs are broadly defined
as all of the additional costs an organization operating
in a market overseas incurs that a local organization
would not incur. In this article, we focus on the firm’s
specific costs based on a particular founder’s foreignness
and lack of roots in a local environment, as well as the
costs resulting from the host country environment. Such
costs can include the lack of legitimacy of the foreign
organization and economic nationalism, since these are
the most salient issues for locally situated immigrantowned organizations. Whatever its source, the liability of
foreignness implies that immigrant organizations, similar
to foreign subsidiaries, will be disadvantaged compared
to local organizations; all else being equal, they are likely
to have lower profitability and perhaps even a lower
probability of survival than local organizations (Zaheer,
1995; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997; Mezias, 2002; Miller
& Parkhe, 2002). Researchers have suggested that the
liability of foreignness is likely to be particularly acute in
a simple, market-seeking, horizontal MNE (Caves, 1982),
which is a multinational whose subunits are essentially
replicas of each other that manufacture or distribute
goods and services in different markets around the
world and compete on a local-for-local basis (Bartlett &
Ghoshal, 1989). Immigrant firms usually approximate the
performance of horizontal MNEs, as they are essentially
simple stand-alone operations in each of the locations in
which they operate (Zaheer, 1995). Due to the small size
of operations in the initial stages of these organizations,
compared to existing organizations, the liability of
foreignness would be expected to be particularly acute in
the simple market-seeking environments.
Recently, researchers studying emerging markets
MNEs have postulated that these organizations face
discrimination in developed host countries, which
may be driven by negative perceptions, stereotypes, or
beliefs (Ramachandran & Pant, 2010). The immigrant
entrepreneurship literature also offers a similar take on
challenges faced by immigrant entrepreneurial ventures.
For example, immigrant entrepreneurs in Germany
report more financial constraints than native German
entrepreneurs report, and are less likely to receive
bank financing because they lack long and established
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bank–customer relationships (Bruder et al., 2011). In the
Netherlands, ventures founded by immigrants have poorer
survival prospects and lower profitability (Baycan-Levent
& Nijkamp, 2009). Furthermore, immigrant-founded
ventures in Scotland have a shorter lifespan, such that
fewer ventures make it into second-generation ownership
(Dassler et al., 2007). In Denmark, immigrant entrepreneurs
face income disadvantages compared to both employed
immigrants and self-employed natives (Baycan-Levent &
Nijkamp, 2009). These examples indicate that liability of
foreignness is a real concern for immigrant-founded firms
(Brenner, Louis, Menzies and Dionne, 2006).
How can immigrant ventures mitigate their liability
of foreignness? The liability of foreignness literature
offers two perspectives: (1) isomorphism, and (2) focus
on firm-specific advantages (e.g., Dunning, 1977; Porter,
1990; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991; Zaheer, 1995). The
isomorphism perspective, from institutional theory, argues
that conforming to local regulations or adapting products
to local tastes and preferences can increase legitimacy and
mitigate organizational mortality (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).
Firm-specific advantages, on the other hand, focus on the
inherent capabilities that strategically differentiate a firm
(Petersen & Pedersen, 2002). Immigrant entrepreneurship
literature has traditionally focused on the ethnic- or firmspecific strategy, whereby migrant entrepreneurs start by
catering to a market of coethnics, often expanding into
non-coethnic markets (Kloosterman & Rath, 2001; Rath and
Kloosterman, 2000). Immigrant firms are often clustered in
industries that have lower entry barriers and do not require
a high degree of human capital (Rath & Koosterman, 2000).
Many immigrant firms, particularly those on the fringes
of profitability, often rely on an ethnic kinship network to
hire and acquire resources (Edwards & Ram, 2006), thus
relying on firm-specific advantages. In fact, many such
transnational entrepreneurs rely on resources in their home
country, and leverage their skills and bilingual resources to
exploit opportunities in their host country (Kloosterman &
Rath, 2001; Zhou, 2004). Such a focus on ethnic strategies,
however, is but one of the choices made by these ethnic
entrepreneurs, and the research into liability of foreignness
has not identified which perspective is a better solution for
immigrant organizations (Miller & Eden, 2006).
We also know that immigrant entrepreneurship
extends well beyond “traditional” ethnic businesses, as
exemplified by the dominance of Indian and Chinese
entrepreneurs in California’s Silicon Valley, as well as by

other immigrant entrepreneurs who often pursue a
variety of strategies beyond simply ethnic ones (Anthias,
2007; Oliveira, 2007; Rath & Kloosterman, 2000). Oliveira
(2007) argues that ethnic entrepreneurs may choose
strategies based on personal resources and their ethnic
group’s resources in the context of the host country’s
labor, entrepreneurial market, and regulatory and political
environment. For example, in Oliveira’s (2007) analysis,
Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs in Portugal relied on
ethnic ties to recruit employees. On the other hand, Indian
entrepreneurs in Portugal preferred hiring non-coethnic
employees. We argue that immigrant entrepreneurs may
find that confirming their national/ethnic identities is
more advantageous when they can obtain the resources
and capabilities from their ethnic group. They make that
choice depending on whether the resources in ethnic
networks can be mobilized within those ethnic networks
(Anthias, 2007). Moreover, they make the decision whether
they want to display themselves as a minority ethnic firm
comprised of all minority employees, or as a mainstream
firm that hires employees from the majority ethnic group.
In fact, Anthias (2007, p. 799) states that the ethnicity
of entrepreneurial ventures can be dynamic as “ethnic
resources are used situationally, abandoned or recreated
as in constructing new forms of ethnic authenticity or in
switching ethnicity,” indicating that immigrant employers
may sometimes choose not to use an ethnic identity as
they launch entrepreneurial endeavors, focusing instead
on the strategy of isomorphism. We therefore posit
through SIT that both competitive/ethnic firm advantages
and isomorphic perspectives need to be considered as
identity strategies to mitigate organizational mortality.
Social Identity Theory and Liability of Foreignness
In the literature on MNES, the liability of foreignness is
associated with the costs of doing business abroad that
result in a competitive disadvantage to an MNE subunit
(Hymer, 1976; Kindleberger, 1969). These costs have been
broadly defined as all additional costs an organization
operating in a market overseas incurs that a local
organization would not incur. In general, the liability of
foreignness can arise from at least four sources that are not
necessarily independent: (1) costs directly associated with
spatial distance, such as the costs of travel, transportation,
and coordination over distance and across time zones;
(2) firm-specific costs based on a particular company’s
unfamiliarity with and lack of roots in a local environment;
(3) costs from the host country environment, such as the
lack of legitimacy of foreign organizations and economic
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nationalism; (4) costs from the home country environment,
such as restrictions, quotas, or tariffs on sales imposed
on U.S.-owned MNEs to certain countries. The relative
importance of these costs and the choices made on how
to deal with them vary from organization to organization.
Whatever its source, the liability of foreignness implies
that foreign immigrant organizations will have lower
profitability than local organizations, all else being equal,
and perhaps even a lower probability of survival, leading
to mortality. In the liability of foreignness literature, Zaheer
(1995) and Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) concluded that
the exchange trading operations of foreign subsidiaries
have a lower survival rate than those of domestic
rivals. Miller and Parkhe (2002) also found that foreign
subsidiaries perform more poorly than domestic firms,
while Mezias (2002) concluded that foreign subsidiaries
face more lawsuits than their domestic rivals. Researchers
have suggested that the liability of foreignness is likely
to be particularly acute in a simple, market-seeking,
horizontal MNE (Caves, 1982).
Immigrant startups usually approximate horizontal
MNEs, as they are essentially simple stand-alone operations
in each of the locations in which they operate (Zaheer,
1995). Due to the small size of operations compared
to existing organizations, the liability of foreignness
would be expected to be particularly acute in the simple
market-seeking environments. Thus, a key factor for
these organizations will be overcoming their liability of
foreignness. Competitive strategies that focus on firmspecific advantages and isomorphism have thus far been
the most suggested solutions for improving performance
for immigrant-owned organizations (e.g., Dunning, 1977;
Porter, 1990; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991; Zaheer, 1995).
The isomorphism perspective, which is from institutional
theory, argues that conforming to local regulations or
adapting products to local tastes and preferences can
increase legitimacy and mitigate organizational mortality
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Nevertheless, the research on
liability of foreignness has not identified which perspective
might be the best solution for immigrant organizations
(Miller & Eden, 2006). We therefore posit through SIT that
both competitive and isomorphic perspectives need to be
considered to avert organizational mortality.
SIT maintains that individuals in societies or
organizations categorize themselves into groups where
similar others become members of a positively valued ingroup, while dissimilar others are categorized as members
20

of a less valued out-group (Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998;
Mummendey, et al., 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell,
1994). The SIT literature posits that members of the
out-group work on their self-presentation in pursuit of
enhancing their image and negotiating their group status.
A large body of literature within identity theory focuses on
issues of employee diversity in firms, and has shown how
employees who do not form a part of the majority identity
group (especially white and male in the context of Western
firms) have to deal with their ethnic identities at work
(Bell, 1990). Just as individuals deal with their ethnic and
national identities in diverse workplaces, firms also engage
in a variety of different practices to develop a coherent
identity that provides them with a sense of self when
dealing with multiple constituents (Brickson, 2000). Given
that the identity of the founder is closely intertwined with
the identity of the firm (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Shepherd
& Haynie, 2009), immigrant-owned organizations can be
perceived as belonging to the out-group category when
compared to local firms. Hence, we contend that they
will try to negotiate their social identity to overcome the
liability of foreignness that can emerge from this outgroup status. Studies have also shown how firms need
to project their organizational identities strategically,
especially when the identity is undervalued or threatened
(Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996).
One of the major areas in which social identity theory
informs scholars of organization is in trying to understand
how the identity of the organization unfolds in the context
of the business and its operations (Ashforth & Mael, 1996).
Organizational identity has been defined as the perception
of the organization’s central, distinctive, and enduring
qualities that are shared by its members (Brickson, 2007;
Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Pratt & Foreman, 2000). Scholars
of organizational identity have used social identity theory
to formulate the behavior of organizations, or portray the
perceptions of stakeholders (Ashforth & Mael, 1996). It has
emerged as a focal area of study within the literature of
organization studies, in which scholars have attempted
to show how the identity of the firm makes a difference
in the firm’s behaviors. The firm’s behaviors under scrutiny
are usually its orientation toward stakeholders (Brickson,
2007), diversification (Barney, 1998), and decision-making
(Stimpert et al., 1998). It also has implications for firm
strategies, since identity, which speaks of a “theory of
being,” and strategy, which speaks of the “theory of action,”
are heavily connected (Stimpert et al., 1998). Questions
about which comes first—a cognition of the organization’s
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identity that leads to actions, or a set of behaviors in the initial
stages of the firm that creates the identity in retrospect—are
difficult to answer. Firm identity offers an organization a
sense of uniqueness, a competitive advantage, and may help
during times of change and when dealing with complexity
(Whetten & Godfrey, 1998). At the same time, organizational
identity has emerged as a crucial aspect of the field of
strategic management, but is still relatively understudied
in the field of entrepreneurship. According to Clegg et
al. (2007), newly emerging industries try to develop their
specific unique identities in their search for legitimacy,
which is an important factor for startups. Li et al. (2007)
theorized that there are specific social expectations or social
identity codes that are set for firms, and conforming to them
generates social legitimacy for them.
The question then becomes, how do immigrantowned firms come into these sets of norms and identity
codes? Their liability of foreignness often comes with the
challenge of overcoming the firm’s foreign identity-related
stereotypes (Waldinger, 1989), along with other challenges
to establishing legitimacy of operations in a different
country. The founders often need to make decisions
that also reflect how they deal with their immigrant
experiences and national stereotypes at the level of the
firm. For example, some founders may decide to play up
their firms’ immigrant identity, thereby making different
decisions than other immigrant entrepreneurs who
underplay their national/immigrant identity and want to
show the host nations that their firm is essentially a local
firm (or identifies and is part of the country in which it is
located). These identity strategies are aimed at gaining
legitimacy and mitigating the liability of foreignness, and
thereby increase chances of survival as foreign firms are
disadvantaged compared to local ones in a way that could
potentially lead to higher levels of mortality (Zaheer, 1995;
Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997; Mezias, 2002; Miller & Parkhe,
2002). In the next section, we develop a typology of
strategies immigrant entrepreneurs undertake to survive
and mitigate organizational mortality resulting from the
liability of foreignness.

Identity Strategies for Negotiating Foreignness
At the organizational level, the identity orientation of a
firm addresses the question of “who are we with respect to
our stakeholders” (Brickson, 2007). Brickson further argues
that identity conceptualization gives the organization a
strategic bent that determines how a firm would react to the
various actors in the environment. Organizations develop

identity strategies to define what they are not (Elsbach &
Bhattacharya, 2001), as well as what they are (Dutton &
Dukerich, 1991). Furthermore, Elsbach and Kramer (1996)
found that individuals within organizations, when faced with
a negative identity of their organization, attempt to restore
positive social identities by distancing themselves from this
tarnished identity. Thus, we argue that immigrant firms take
their founder’s immigrant identity into account, and choose
particular identity strategies when dealing with stakeholders.
SIT suggests that when individuals with minority
social identities work in diverse contexts, they could
either downplay their different social identities or play
up their minority identities (Roberts, 2005). The literature
on immigration has addressed this issue through larger
policies of assimilation (which believes that immigrant
groups could become like the majority and cede their
culture over time) and multiculturalism (which emphasizes
the need to maintain the cultural differences of the
immigrant communities), thereby supporting the twin
forces for confirming and underplaying one’s foreignness
(Zhou, 2004; Handlin, 1973; Glazer & Moynihan, 1970).
Besides negating or affirming ethnic identity, extant
research also suggests that firms develop their identity to
be oriented toward their stakeholders in an individualistic
or collectivistic way (Brickson, 2007). For example,
some firms develop their identity as individual, distinct
organizations that are in competition with others, while
others may define themselves as members of a larger
social community, thereby working toward a legitimacy
for the whole industry or group (Brickson, 2007). Based
on these two broad categories—(1) a firm’s individualistic
or associative/collectivist orientation, and (2) immigrant
founders’ decisions to either underplay or confirm their
foreign identity—we propose four different kinds of
identity strategies that a firm can adopt to mitigate the
liability of foreignness (see Figure 1).
Underplaying the Ethnic Identity with an Individual
Identity Orientation. Immigrant firms who choose to
underplay the ethnic identities of their founders, and
who also operate as individual firms whose identity
would be distinct from any specific group, tend to adopt
a strategy of social recategorization. In general, social
recategorization is the process by which individuals
try to achieve social mobility by changing the social
categories (groups) that they have been assigned (Tajfel,
1982). Individuals in firms often achieve this by hiding
their identities (e.g., homosexual individuals try to pass
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Figure 1. Identity Strategies of Immigrant Entrepreneurs
Identity Strategies for Mitigating Liability of Foreignness
Identity orientations

Underplay

Individual

Recategorization strategy
Emphasize firm distinctiveness in
competition with other firms,
de-emphasize foreign/ethnic roots
of founder. Example: Ralph Lauren

Positive distinctiveness strategy
Emphasize firm distinctiveness in
competition with other firms but
based on the positive attributes of the
firm’s immigrant founder’s ethnicity.
Example: Tiffins

Collective

Social creativity strategy
Work as a member of a collective, but
one that is not based on the founder’s
ethnic roots. Example: Skyscape

Social competition strategy
Work as a member of a collective
based on the founder’s ethnic identity.
Example: restaurants in Chinatown, firms
in The Indus Entrepreneur (TIE) group

as heterosexuals at work to avoid discrimination) or
by trying to enact dominant identities (e.g., women
who display masculine behaviors to combat gender
stereotyping) (Roberts, 2005). Immigrant firms who
adopt these strategies might downplay their foreignness
or the founder’s immigrant identity. They might try to
pass themselves off as just another local firm. To achieve
this, firms may try to hire employees from the dominant
majority, who would provide a professional mainstream
face to the organization. An example of this kind of
recategorization strategy would be Ralph Lauren (founder
of the Polo Ralph Lauren Company), who changed his
Russian last name, and tried to capitalize on the character
of the old English countryside to incorporate into the
aristocratic American social class firm image (Agins, 2002).
Another interesting example of underplaying identities
is the case of eClinicalWorks—a well-known health care
solutions company started by Indian founders who
completely underplayed their immigrant identity by not
discussing their founders’ identities on their website and
other publications.
Proposition 1a. Some immigrant entrepreneurial firms
with an individual identity orientation will undertake a
social categorization strategy by underplaying their foreign
identity such that they may neutralize visible foreign
identity markers to seem more like a local firm.

22

Confirm

Underplaying the Ethnic Identity with Collective
Identity Orientation. How immigrant firms often form
groups for survival in foreign lands has been a popular
topic of research as seen in the literature on immigrant
social networks and enclaves (Peterson and Meckler,
2001). Not all immigrant firms, however, want to associate
with other firms of the same ethnicity. Instead, some
firms may underplay their immigrant identity and define
their group membership by belonging to a burgeoning
industry or some other specific cause (e.g., groups
promoting community-based software, etc.), thereby
forming a collective based on characteristics other than
ethnicity; this is referred to as social creativity strategy.
Social creativity strategy entails the process by which
employees change the way they focus on specific
identities that may be unrelated to their identities such
as that of foreign origins. Thus, they emphasize other
parts of their identities more by highlighting different
aspects of their national identity that have more positive
connotations. (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). This is evident in
observations of minority individuals such as women. When
negative stereotypes about women’s work are prevalent,
women tend to emphasize positive skills of their specific
group, like friendliness or ability to network (Kanter, 1983).
This example of changing the mode of evaluation from
focusing on gender to other desirable characteristics is
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viewed positively by the majority other. Similarly, some
immigrant firms that underplay the foreignness and ethnic
identities of their founder try to emphasize other qualities
that would make them a valuable member of other firms
in the same industry. In the high-tech industry, there is
a tendency for a collectivistic approach, with most firms
emphasizing the technological prowess or educational
affiliations or achievements of their founder and not the
characteristics associated with the national origins of the
founder (Insch & Miller, 2005). For instance, Apple’s founder
Steve Jobs’ creative and technological prowess has
always been showcased, but his Syrian heritage is rarely
discussed and thus downplayed. Other examples include
Genelab and Vivo Ventures, where they foreground the
immigrant founders’ specific qualifications but not their
countries of origin. Similarly, Skyscape, a company started
by immigrants, emphasizes the educational and technical
qualifications of the founders and downplays their ethnic
and national origins. All in all, these firms act as members
of a larger community of firms engaged in high-tech
businesses rather than individuals who are members of a
specific ethnic community.
Proposition 1b. Immigrant entrepreneurial firms with
a collective identity orientation may pursue a social
creativity strategy by underplaying their foreign identity
such that they adopt visible identity markers aligning them
with a larger group that transcends ethnic boundaries.
Confirming the Ethnic Identity with an Individual
Identity Orientation. Not all immigrant founders of
enterprises want to downplay their national origins. In
spite of existing costs of foreignness, as opposed to the
above examples, certain immigrant firms decide to affirm
their ethnic identities. These firms project the national
and cultural orientations of the founder in their dealings
with stakeholders. An example of is ethnic restaurants
that compete on the virtue of authentic ethnic cuisine.
Such restaurants promise an authentic dining and cultural
experience through their menu, display of artifacts, and
symbols from the founder’s home country. Another
example is seen among immigration lawyers, doctors,
travel agents, and accountants who focus on specific
ethnic groups. These firms employ individuals of specific
ethnic nationalities as a part of the authentic presentation
and as a way to network within the community for
customers. Tiffins, an Australia-based food company,
clearly follows this strategy by its bold use of colors and
symbols that front the immigrant founder’s roots. Similarly,

Patel Brothers, a chain of U.S. grocery stores, prominently
discusses its immigrant story on the company’s website.
We argue that these firms display a “restoring positive
distinctiveness” strategy. Restoring positive distinctiveness
is the process of confirming one’s identity group
memberships and trying to achieve positive value for
it (Roberts, 2005). As such, playing on specific identityrelated stereotypes and using them for strategic benefits is
a strategy for restoring positive distinctiveness.
Proposition 2a. Some immigrant entrepreneurial firms
with an individual identity orientation will undertake a
strategy of restoring social distinctiveness by confirming
their foreign identity to differentiate themselves to achieve
positive value.
Confirming the Ethnic Identity with a Collective
Identity Orientation. Immigrant groups commonly
work in collectives whereby they form strong, cohesive
communities in foreign lands to help members with
employment networks and other resources. Within the
literature of immigrant entrepreneurship, a number of
studies on ethnic networks and enclaves provide examples
of collectivist identity orientation that build membership
around ethnic/national identities. These firms confirm
their identities but also operate with a collective identity
orientation in that they often compete with other ethnic
groups and other dominant majority players. Such firms
would have a collectivistic goal of the development
of the entire immigrant group and often base it on
a display of the stereotypes associated with group.
Chattopadhyay et al. (2004) have explained this form of
a collectivistic strategy as social competition strategy.
An example is when minority or low-status individuals
in firms try to improve the status of their entire group
by competing with other groups (e.g., women fighting
for equal pay at work) (French, 2001). In the case of
immigrant entrepreneurs, this can be seen in the instance
of organizations of immigrant South Asian technology
entrepreneurs, such as TiE (The Indus Entrepreneur).
This group is explicit in its mission of fostering
entrepreneurship through mentoring and resources, and
have been argued to develop “ethnic identities within
the region and facilitate the professional networking and
information exchange that aid success” (Saxenian, 1999,
p. 10). Similar organizations, such as HACCI (Hellenic
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry), are also
found in other countries, catering to different immigrant
groups. In the case of HACCI, the group was formed to

AN ANALYSIS OF IDENTITY STRATEGIES IN IMMIGRANT-OWNED ORGANIZATIONS

https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol20/iss1/5

23

24

et al.: New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Spring/Summer 2017

provide support for Greek entrepreneurs in Australia.
Such organizations are common in ethnic enclaves, such
as Little Italy or Chinatown. Furthermore, there is little
overlap in the memberships of such organizations across
ethnic groups (Saxenian, 1999), indicating that immigrant
identity is an important determinant of organizational
membership. These examples show that immigrant
entrepreneurs with a collective orientation may confirm
their foreign identity and adopt a strategy of social
competitiveness.
Proposition 2b. Some immigrant entrepreneurial firms
with a collectivist identity orientation will undertake a
social competitiveness strategy by confirming their foreign
identity such that they may adopt visible identity markers
to align themselves with other business of that ethnicity.
Contextual Moderators in the Relationship
In the above paragraphs, we identified key identity
strategies stemming from the founders’ national origins
that immigrant firms may adopt to mitigate their liability of
foreignness. Assuming that the chances of organizational
mortality are affected by any of these identity strategies
alone, however, would be naïve. Contextual factors may
impact the effectiveness of these identity strategies
such that there may be contextual moderators in this
relationship between the choice of firm identity strategy
and organizational mortality. In this article, we focus on
three contextual moderators: (1) image of the founder’s
country of origin, (2) presence of immigrant networks
in the host country, and (c) the industry. We focus on
these moderators, as opposed to others, since there is
substantial consensus in the literature to argue that they
are some of the key factors affecting the survival of a new
firm in some form or other (Armengot et al., 2010; Kariv et
al., 2009; Moren et al., 2009; Mustafa and Chen, 2010).
Image of the Founder’s Country of Origin. Extensive
literature has examined how the firm’s country of origin
affects buyers’ perception (see, for example, Wall &
Heslop, 1986). Empirical evidence supports the fact that
sometimes consumers stereotype for or against foreign
products (e.g., Peterson & Jolibert, 1995; Thakor & Katsanis,
1997), and the country of origin can be perceived as a
signal for product quality (Roth & Diamantopoulos, 2009).
Porter succinctly captured the essence of country image in
The Competitive Advantage of Nations, stating, “…country of
origin seems to strongly condition success in international
competition” (1990, p. 52). In the same vein, Kostova and
Zaheer (1999) argued when host-country institutions
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lacked information about foreign-owned firms, they used
stereotypes (positive or negative) and a different standard
to judge them. Recent literature has argued that such
country image perceptions have cognitive, affective, and
conative attributes that are known to be informational
cues to consumers as well as other institutions (Roth
& Diamantopoulos, 2009). Such judgments can affect
the survival and performance of new firms founded
by immigrant entrepreneurs. For example, the positive
reputation of European (especially German) toys in the
United States might mean that an immigrant entrepreneur
from Germany in the toy industry would benefit from
his or her ethnic identity. On the other hand, Chinese
entrepreneurs in the toy industry may be disadvantaged
by their country’s image due to recent negative press
about lead paints in China. Empirically, we know that UKbased Pakistani businesses have not done as well as Indian
businesses because of, in part, country image issues (Basu
& Altinay, 2002).
Based on these studies, we expect an interactive effect
between the choice of strategy and the image of the
immigrant founder’s country of origin. When the immigrant
founder’s country of origin has a positive image, identity
strategy of confirming (either positive distinctiveness or
social competition) will be more effective in mitigating
mortality. On the other hand, when the immigrant
entrepreneur’s country of origin has a negative image, the
identity strategy of underplaying ethnic identity will be
more effective in warding off organizational mortality (either
recategorization or social creativity). Therefore, in such cases,
they are more likely to underplay their national identity and
try to project different aspects of their identity to mitigate
the liability of foreignness that stems from a poor founder
country origin. This would, in turn, increase their chance of
survival. Thus, we propose:
Proposition 3a. The relationship between choice of
identity strategy and mortality will be moderated by
the image of the founder’s country of origin, such that
confirming strategies will be more effective in mitigating
mortality when the entrepreneur’s country of origin has a
positive image.
Proposition 3b. The relationship between choice of
identity strategy and mortality will be moderated by
the image of the founder’s country of origin, such that
underplaying strategies will be more effective in mitigating
mortality when the entrepreneur’s country of origin has a
negative image.
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Immigrant Networks. Liability of foreignness literature
suggests that immigrant-owned organizations can
offset some of the disadvantages they face in the
host country by bringing firm-specific advantages or
intangible assets with them (Caves 1982; Dunning, 1977).
A key resource that can dispel this disadvantage comes
from their networks, both in their home countries and
in the immigrant communities they belong to in their
host countries. For instance, foreign organizations have
been found to depend more on imports than local
organizations because they have more networks in foreign
countries than local organizations do (Lipsey, 1993).
Some immigrant-owned organizations form enclaves
of ethnic communities from their home country for the
purposes of having access to consumers and laborers
who share common bonds (Portes & Jensen, 1989; Wilson
& Portes, 1980). Social enclaves are defined as domains
of less turbulence and more manageable social space
that are created by members to defend themselves
from external demands (McCann & Selsky, 1984). Such
social networks are also found in non-enclave situations.
For example, Saxenian states that Chinese and Indian
immigrant technology entrepreneurs “created social and
professional networks among themselves on the basis of
shared language, culture, and educational and professional
experiences” (1999, p. 27). Similarly, Cuban immigrants in
Miami have set up networks to aid new startups (Peterson
and Meckler, 2001), while Albanian entrepreneurs in
Slovenia rely on a coethnic Albanian workforce (Vadnjal
& Letonja, 2009). Such social networks are critical for
new entrepreneurial ventures; they provide access to
information, access to financial resources, and connections
for the first suppliers or customers (Chung & Whalen, 2006;
Bruderl et al., 1992). In all phases of entrepreneurial activity,
firms rely on their social networks for support and for
resources (Greve & Salaff, 2003). These networks, however,
are not available to all groups of immigrants in all host
countries to which they may migrate (Saxenian et al., 2002).
While social networks are important to all
entrepreneurial ventures, the value of immigrant social
networks may differ for firms that follow different identity
strategies. Firms that adopt a confirmation strategy are
more likely to rely on immigrant networks to mitigate
organizational mortality when compared to those who
employ assimilation/isomorphism strategies. Firms
that underplay their ethnic origins may find drawing
on resources from their immigrant networks to be less
effective. For example, a firm that confirms its ethnic

identity can effectively utilize its coethnic immigrant
workforce, and such networks can be a resource that
contributes to the firm’s strategy. Similarly, Korean RCAs
provide necessary financial support for Korean immigrant
entrepreneurs, allowing them to enter industries that
require greater capital. On the other hand, when
immigrant entrepreneurs do not have access to ethnic
networks, employing the identity confirmation strategy
may be less effective. Therefore, we argue that immigrant
organizations that are able to tap into social networks
from their home country will have an advantage when
they follow the identity strategy of confirming their ethnic
identity. Thus, we propose:
Proposition 4. The relationship between choice of
strategy and mortality will be moderated by immigrant
networks; that is, if the immigrant firm has access to
immigrant networks, confirming strategies will be more
effective in mitigating mortality.

Industry
Industry characteristics differ across many dimensions,
including industry life cycle, economies of scale, and capital
intensity, among others. The impact of identity strategies on
firm mortality will vary, as these strategies are contingent
upon industry characteristics. In their new country,
immigrant entrepreneurs may lack access to capital (Light
and Bonacich, 1988), thus preventing them from entering
capital-intensive industries with large economies of scale.
For instance, Kushnirovich & Heilbrunn (2008) found that
in Israel, the scope of funding for immigrant businesses is
significantly smaller than that of non-immigrant businesses.
They further revealed that immigrant entrepreneurs are
more likely to finance their businesses from informal sources
than non-immigrant entrepreneurs. Identity strategy
that allows the immigrant firm to draw on funding from
family and friends, and perhaps even the wider immigrant
community, may have a better chance of survival. With a
limited access to capital, a confirmation strategy would help
mitigate liability of foreignness and increase chances of
survival for immigrant firms that are in low capital-intensive
industries that can be funded by small community networkbased sources of money.
During the early stage of an industry’s life cycle, when
entry barriers and costs are still relatively lower (Agarwal
et al., 2002), immigrant firms face fewer obstacles. As an
industry enters maturity, barriers to entry increase. During
the early stages, entrepreneurs can stress the uniqueness
of a new product or service to a small group of customers,
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the “early adopters.” These “early adopters” may be the
immigrant community and their networks. During the
growth and maturity stages of an industry, competition
from late entrants will be apparent, and these new
entrants will try to take over market shares from existing
and more established products. Therefore, ethnic firms
founded by immigrant entrepreneurs that cater to small,
niche, unserved, or underserved markets have a greater
chance of survival than in a mature industry. During the
growth and maturity stages, an identity strategy that
allows the immigrant firm to draw on its immigrant
resources may have a better chance of survival, given
the requirement for more resources and resourcefulness
to compete in such markets. Overall, consistent with the
mixed embeddedness approach (Kloosterman, 2010;
Kloosterman & Rath, 2001; Tolciu, 2011), the effect of ethnic
identity strategy on venture survival will be moderated by
industry characteristics. Thus, we propose:

We do not claim, however, that the four proposed
strategies (Figure 1) are the only strategies that immigrant
entrepreneurial firms can adopt to mitigate the liability
of foreignness and its consequences. In fact, our article
attempts to conceptualize what could be different kinds
of strategies that immigrant firms can employ to deal with
their ethnicities. This theoretical ideal-type model captures
the concomitant considerations in formation of identity
strategies of firms started by immigrant entrepreneurs.
The firms may choose to underplay, enhance/confirm, or
emphasize their immigrant identity in order to reduce their
liability of foreignness, promote the chances of survival,
and reduce mortality. This model further proposes that
the impact of these identity strategies will be moderated
by several aspects, including the immigrants’ country
image in their host countries, in their networks, and in their
social capital of immigrant entrepreneurs as well as time,
industry, and life cycle position of the business.

Proposition 5. The relationship between choice of
strategy and mortality will be moderated by industry
characteristics such that in industries with lower entry
barriers, lower capital intensity and early stages of industry,
confirmation strategy will be more successful in mitigating
the organizational mortality.

This study offers a conceptual model of identity
strategies of immigrant-owned entrepreneurial firms
and empirical support to enhance understanding of
the phenomenon of entrepreneurial identity strategies.
The study can be tested in the context of many different
immigrant communities that are involved in a diverse
set of industries and enterprises. While a complete test
of our model (especially with all the moderators) may
pose significant challenges, multiple individual cases of
immigrant firms can be created to help discover identity
strategies, thereby developing an understanding of the
motivations in making one specific identity choice over
another. Moreover, the current model can be extended
in several directions. Firm identities are not static; they
change over time and in response to their environments.
The dynamic nature of social identity strategies of
immigrant organizations is evident among the Silicon
Valley entrepreneurs. Saxenian (1999:11) succinctly points
out that “most successful immigrant entrepreneurs
in Silicon Valley today are those who have drawn on
ethnic resources while simultaneously integrating
into mainstream technology and business networks.”
Similarly, the identity strategies of immigrant enterprises
can be important in determining strategic initiatives
undertaken by the firm. For example, firms owned by
immigrant entrepreneurs that confirm their identity
may be better poised to be “born global” and develop
early internationalization efforts between the country of
origin and the host country. Exploring linkages between
identity strategies and early globalization of startup firms

Discussion
Entrepreneurship is essentially a context-dependent
social process (Low & Abrahamson, 1997), and social and
cultural dynamics are key aspects for understanding the
phenomenon of entrepreneurship (Lounsbury & Glynn,
2001). Yet, the phenomenon of entrepreneurship in general,
and migrant entrepreneurship in this particular context,
involves an interplay of individual and opportunity structures
(Kloosterman, 2010), as well as migrant group characteristics
(Aldrich & Waldinger, 1990). The social identity of the venture,
however, as it is situated in the social context as well as the
opportunity structure, has been relatively understudied in
the context of organization studies. Entrepreneurs draw on
(1) who they are, (2) what they know, and (3) whom they
know (Sarasvathy, 2001) in their entrepreneurial endeavors.
These three factors also constitute the essence of identity in
ventures founded by immigrants. Not surprisingly, immigrant
entrepreneurial firms are conscious of their “identities” and
use them as a strategy to mitigate the perils of liability of
foreignness. Fauchart and Gruber (2011) show that the
identity of the founder is crucial in determining how a firm
is shaped and the actions it undertakes. We extend that
literature to the topic of migrant entrepreneurship.
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is another avenue for further research. Furthermore, our
model is ideal for profit -making firms, but testing it in the
context of all organizations or nonprofits to check how the
dynamic might differ could be worthwhile.
By pulling together diverse strands of literature
from liability of foreignness and SIT, this article attempts
to understand the identity strategy of immigrant
entrepreneurial firms as a means for mitigating the liability
of foreignness. Heeding the call of research by Rath and
Kloosterman (2000), we bring the more theoretically
grounded perspective of identity theory into the migrant
entrepreneurship literature. Instead of viewing immigrant
entrepreneurs as a priori ethnic beings, we argue that
the identity strategies are formed to mitigate the liability
of foreignness. We contribute to the perspective that
such strategies are embedded in social, institutional, and
opportunity structures.

Limitations of the Model
Our proposed model, like most analytical tools, has
some limitations. The model tells only part of a story by
focusing on just four identity strategies. Its usefulness will,
therefore, be limited to firms that can broadly identify
themselves with the proposed strategies. Firms founded

by entrepreneurial teams from cross-cultural backgrounds
may not find the model applicable to them. We only
explored approaches adopted by immigrant firms to
mitigate their liability of foreignness in new environments.
While we focused on newly formed organizations, further
studies should investigate the impact of organization size
or life cycle stage on the identity strategies a firm selects to
mitigate mortality and overall liability of foreignness.
Secondly, the proposed model focuses on mortality
rather than other indicators of performance of the immigrant
firm such as profitability or growth. It needs to examine
whether these propositions would hold for firm performance,
especially if a confirmation strategy can allow a firm to be
a part of the mainstream in order to have greater market
share growth. Finally, this model is based on the assumption
of a sole proprietor/entrepreneur or a homogenous
entrepreneurial team, at least on the basis of ethnicity. This
assumption is too simplistic even for a sole proprietor/
entrepreneur. Many entrepreneurs are conscious of the
benefits of being ambicultural—the ability and willingness
to blend the best of different cultures. Therefore, confirming
or downplaying ethnic identity may not be an option for the
ambicultural entrepreneur.
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Just a Lemonade Stand
An Introduction to Student Entrepreneurship
Alka Gupta
Vishal Gupta

D

espite the increasing popularity of entrepreneurship
among students in colleges and university, there is a
surprising scarcity of theoretical or empirical research
on this topic. In this article, we define the concept of student
entrepreneurship, delineate its domain, and demarcate its
boundaries. We propose a preliminary typology of student
entrepreneurship rooted in the works of three leading economists
from the Austrian School of Economics: Joseph Schumpeter, Israel
Kirzner, and Ludwig Lachmann. We also identify and discuss
important challenges associated with the practice of student
entrepreneurship. The article concludes by advancing a future
research agenda for the study of student entrepreneurship.
Keywords: student entrepreneurship; archetypal
entrepreneurship; entrepreneurship education
Student entrepreneurship has emerged as an important
topic in popular media and public discourse in recent years.
Though there is no reliable and comprehensive data on
the exact number of student entrepreneurs in colleges and
universities in United States, the level of entrepreneurial
activity among college students appears to be quite high
(Seymour, 2001). Notable examples of student entrepreneurs
include, but are not limited to, Michael Dell (founded Dell
Computers in his dorm room at the University of Texas),
Mark Zuckerberg (created Facebook with his roommates
at Harvard), and Larry Page (co-founder of Google as a
student at Stanford). Businesses founded by students come
in all shapes and sizes, ranging from high tech to low tech,
manufacturing to service, local to global (Bower, 2003). Even
as entrepreneurial activity among students continues to
increase, there is a surprising lack of scholarly research related
to the topic of student entrepreneurship.
Some educators and policymakers believe that
student entrepreneurship helps students by providing
them opportunities to combine theory and practice in a
positive and pragmatic sense (Ridder & Sijde, 2006). Others
argue that involvement in business activities, especially the
kind of activities required to start a new business, during
school years likely interferes with students’ academic
progress, which may adversely affect their future academic
goals (Ndirangu & Bosire, 2004). These complex issues

need to be resolved to provide guidance to educators,
students, parents, and policymakers. This article identifies
and discusses the domain of student entrepreneurship, its
contributions, and the many challenges its practices raise
for various stakeholders.
The objective of this article is three-fold. First, it seeks
to bring much needed clarity to the concept of student
entrepreneurship. There is a high (and still increasing)
rate of entrepreneurial activity among students and
schools and colleges are investing valuable (financial
and intellectual) resources to encourage student
entrepreneurship. Unfortunately, scholarly dialog on
this topic is almost negligible, and consequently our
understanding of student entrepreneurship is quite
limited. In this article, we offer a definition that delineates
the domain of student entrepreneurship and demarcates
its boundaries in an effort to build some consensus on
what student entrepreneurship is (and is not).
Second, this article distinguishes between various
forms of student entrepreneurship. In do so, we present
a mutually exclusive preliminary typology of student
entrepreneurs, identifying and providing examples of three
types of student entrepreneurs. All student entrepreneurs
are not the same and the potential of new ventures
started by these entrepreneurs to become contributors to
the (local and national) economy is not equal (Chrisman
& McMullen, 2000). Further, scholars have relied on the
intention and behavior model (Ajzen, 1991) to explore
the psychological and situation cues underlying student
entrepreneurship. Our study is timely because, on the one
hand, student entrepreneurship is on rise and is garnering
much attention in the media and college classrooms in
United States and across the world; and on the other hand,
scholars have expressed frustration on the confusion that
exists related to student entrepreneurs (Marchand & Sood,
2014). We hope that borrowing the typology from the
alternative paradigm—Austrian economics will reap the
same benefit of providing new insights, as it has in the
entrepreneurship research—the typology presented in this
article will allow educators, researchers, and policymakers
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to make sense of the different types of student
entrepreneurs routinely observed in schools and colleges.
This article gives researchers a framework to conduct
research with student entrepreneurs, helping them better
understand what they see and hear during their research.
It will also provide educators and policymakers with a tool
to help target their limited resources to the most highpotential student entrepreneurs and their ventures.
The final objective of the article is to explore some of
the challenges engendered by student entrepreneurship.
Student entrepreneurs, unlike other entrepreneurs, play a
dual role of a student and an entrepreneur and therefore,
need to balance the demands of their studentship with that
of their entrepreneurship. This study, therefore, focuses on
those undergraduate students who attend classes and also
lead a start-up while enrolled in university courses. They do
not wait to join any other firm to gain experience, confidence,
or salary, nor do they have any family responsibilities.
Studies show high number of students intend to pursue
entrepreneurial activity after they graduate but less than 1 in
10 graduates actually embark on an entrepreneurial career
(Kwong & Thompson, 2016). Student entrepreneurial activity
is inhibited by the lack of start-up capital and excessive
regulation and universities policies (Bailetti, 2011; Veciana,
Aponte, & Urbano, 2005). Effectively balancing the quest for
learning and scholarship with the financial and operations
skills associated with starting and managing a business
raises important issues for all stakeholders. Consequently, we
discuss several problems and issues that may arise because of
the practice of student entrepreneurship.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows:
First, we define student entrepreneurship and draw its
boundaries as a distinct field of study. Specifically, we
advance a definition of student entrepreneurship based
on common themes observed in the literature. Next, we
introduce a preliminary typology of student entrepreneurs
grounded in the work of three prominent scholars from
Austrian School of Economics: (Joseph Schumpeter, Israel
Kirzner, and Ludwig Lachmann). We believe our typology
provides a theoretical framework for future scholars to
understand and make sense of the differences among
the many types of student entrepreneurs. Following
the presentation of this typology, we identify important
problems that the practice of student entrepreneurship may
cause for the different stakeholders. In the last section of
the article, we offer suggestions about the future of student
entrepreneurship as a distinct field for scholarly inquiry.

34

Toward a Definition of Student Entrepreneurship
Student entrepreneurship has generated a substantial
interest in the media and public discourse. Many popular
books have been written about student entrepreneurs
(e.g., Beyond the Lemonade Stand), and hundreds, if not
thousands, of articles and stories about them have
appeared in the media. In recent years, a large number
of U.S. and international colleges and universities have
acknowledged the fundamentally important role of
student entrepreneurship in society and actively engaged
in promoting student entrepreneurship and students’
enterprising behavior (Vesper & Gartner, 2001.). The
Global Student Entrepreneur Award, started at St. Louis
University in 1988 for students of midwestern United
States, has since expanded to include many countries.
Student entrepreneurship clubs are widespread in U.S.
schools and colleges and the number of such clubs is
steadily increasing (Vesper & Gartner, 1997). Universities
are receiving substantial donor funding to start institutes
and centers (e.g., the Edson Student Entrepreneur
Initiative at Arizona State University) to encourage student
entrepreneurship (Krass, 2004). More than 1,600 schools
now offer about 2,200 entrepreneurship-related courses
that seek to increase the understanding and knowledge
of entrepreneurship and new business among students
and infuse them with enterprise and entrepreneurial
skills (Katz, 2003; Vesper & Gartner, 1997). There exists a
general consensus among entrepreneurship scholars and
educators that an implicit (if not always explicit) objective
of entrepreneurship courses and programs is to encourage
and prepare students to become entrepreneurs and start
new businesses.
Across the globe entrepreneurially oriented students
have identified business ideas and successfully exploited
them to develop new businesses. For many student
entrepreneurs, the businesses started during their school
years with the help of limited tangible and intangible
resources provided by universities or any other source
became the stepping stones to a life-long career as an
entrepreneur (e.g., Bill Gates, Steve Jobs). This may be
especially true in societies, such as the United States,
where entrepreneurship-related courses have historically
attracted large numbers of students (Katz, 2003) and
there has been a long tradition of young people starting
their own business. With recent trends in globalization and
outsourcing pointing to the fact that college education is
no longer a “sheltered pathway” to a job with a large firm
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for young men and women in developed economies like the
United States (Nabi, Holden, & Walmsley, 2006: 373), schools
and colleges have encouraged and motivated students to
start their own businesses and pursue entrepreneurial careers.
Despite the popular interest in student
entrepreneurship among schools and colleges, almost
no scholarly research exists on this topic. There is
no agreement among scholars about what student
entrepreneurship is and what activities constitute
student entrepreneurship. The fact that the phrase
“student entrepreneurship” combines two words that
have traditionally been considered incongruent, if not
inconsistent, has probably been an important obstacle to
defining and discussing student entrepreneurship.1 There
are disagreements about the domain of entrepreneurship
(Chiles, Bluedorn, & Gupta, 2007; Shane & Venkataraman,
2000); adding the qualifier prefix “student” further
complicates this definitional debate.
The concept of student entrepreneurship means
different things to different scholars. A large group of
researchers use the phrase “student entrepreneurs” to refer to
students enrolled in an entrepreneurship course or program
(Fiet, 2001; Robinson, Huefner, & Hunt 1991). A second group
of researchers understands student entrepreneurs as students
who are engaged in preparing a business plan for a new or
existing growth-oriented business (Katz, Harshman, & Dean,
2000). And a third group views student entrepreneurs as
individuals who are actively pursuing academic coursework
and are running a company (alone or with others) at the
same time (Ridder & Sijde, 2006).
Research on student entrepreneurship to date has
relied on intention models such as the Theory of Planned
Behavior (Ajzen, 1991) or Social Cognitive Theory (Lent et
al., 2002), to examine the intention and entrepreneurial
behavior underlying the student entrepreneurship. Using
data of U.K. business students, Kwong and Thomspon
(2016) investigated the attitudinal differences between
those student entrepreneurs, who immediately start
the entrepreneurial activity after graduating and those
who wait and watch. These authors suggest that student
entrepreneurs who rapidly move into entrepreneurial
activities are more likely to perceive themselves as natural
leaders and are confident of succeeding. Pfeifer, Šarlija,
and Zekić Sušac (2016) explored personal and situation
antecedents of entrepreneurial intentions of business
students in Croatia.

In reviewing the aforementioned definitions, we
do not strive to find a statement that encompasses all
aspects of these seemingly disparate definitions, nor
do we focus on the intention and the behavior model
as the basis for the student entrepreneurship. Instead,
we provide a definition that integrates common points
of view, while inviting the focus on the founder of the
venture—the student entrepreneur. We believe that
student entrepreneurs have dual roles: a student as well
as an entrepreneur. They go to school and take classes
like traditional students, but are involved in starting or
managing a for-profit business (alone or with others)
like conventional entrepreneurs. Consequently, student
entrepreneurship is the process involving the innovative
use and combination of resources to explore and pursue
opportunities through the creation of a for-profit business
organization by a student. Obviously, our definition of
student entrepreneurship is predicated on the belief
that defining “entrepreneurship” is logically linked with
defining “entrepreneur” in that entrepreneurship is what
entrepreneurs do when they are being entrepreneurs
(Peredo & McLean, 2006). Our definition is also consistent
with that of Marchand and Sood (2014). Through
interviews these authors explored the cognitive skills and
the unconscious drives of student entrepreneurs during
pre- and post-university stages.
Entrepreneurship scholars are well aware of the
many definitions of entrepreneurship, ranging from
broad (entrepreneurship as self-employment) to narrow
(entrepreneurship in growth-oriented business and
corporations). Any single definition of entrepreneurship
is seldom able to capture the complete domain of the
field. The definition of student entrepreneurship offered
in this article reflects some of our basic assumptions. First,
student entrepreneurs engage in the process of creating
value by combining and recombining resources, such as
knowledge acquired through entrepreneurship programs,
or physical space, university reputation, and grants in new
ways. Unlike other entrepreneurs, student entrepreneurs
have the opportunity to explore these limited resources,
which they use to gain new network connections. These
resources may be helpful in establishing business or could
be a tool to acquire additional resources for starting a new
venture. Entrepreneurs, including student entrepreneurs,
are not motivated by any one common objective, but by a
diverse set of personal goals, economic and non-economic
(Shane, Locke, & Collins, 2003). Second, these resource
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combinations are intended primarily to explore and pursue
opportunities to earn financial rewards; this includes the
discovery, creation, and exploitation of opportunities
to generate future goods and services (Chiles et al.,
2007; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Though student
entrepreneurs exhibit similar entrepreneurial behavior
as archetypal entrepreneurs, unlike them, students
are limited in terms of resources and entrepreneurial
experience when starting a new venture while still in
school. They rely on their faculty for consultation, advice,
education, and new connections, or take advantage of
the university’s reputation to acquire finances for their
business. And third, student entrepreneurship involves
offering new products or services through the creation
of new organizations (Katz & Gartner, 1988). Importantly,
student entrepreneurship occurs only in the context of a
new organization. This emphasis on the creation of a new
organization sets student entrepreneurship apart from
other more loosely structured initiatives that students may
pursue such as ad hoc self-employment (e.g., students
who mow lawns or sing in a bar on a freelance basis) as
well as more hierarchically structured arrangements such
as employment in another business (e.g., a student worker
who acts entrepreneurially in a new and/or small business
(Kuratko, 2006)) or internship in a large entrepreneurially
oriented corporation (King, Pearson, & Young, 1997; Zahra,
Nielson, & Bogner, 1999)).

A Proposed Typology of Student Entrepreneurship
Our definition of student entrepreneurship highlights
the large domain of the phenomenon of student
entrepreneurship and the diversity of people involved
in this activity. In this section, we propose a threecategory typology for describing student entrepreneurs.
Our typology is designed to assist scholars in
conducting research on student entrepreneurs and
better understanding the antecedents, processes,
and consequences of different forms of student
entrepreneurship. Of course, all typologies are imprecise
(Hornaday, 1990) and our quest for parsimony may
have caused us to overlook other types of student
entrepreneurs. We are not aware of any existing typologies
of student entrepreneurs, so we believe that this article
is a small, albeit important, first step toward improving
scholarly understanding of this complex phenomenon.
Our proposed typology identifies three distinctive
types of student entrepreneurs based on alternative
conceptualizations of entrepreneurship derived from
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Austrian economics. Though long viewed as outsiders
whose rebellious tenets pitted them against mainstream
economic thought, three economists have gained
widespread respectability over the past 30 years as a
heterodox school, both within economics (Vaughn,
1994) and, more recently, among organizational scholars
who predict a vital role for their ideas in 21st-century
organizational research (Eisenhardt, 2002). Indeed,
Austrian economics has become recognized in many
organizational circles as the leading economic approach to
entrepreneurship research (Chiles et al., 2007; Venkataraman,
1997; Shane, 2000).
The three economists that inform our typology of
student entrepreneurs are Joseph Schumpeter, Israel Kirzner,
and Ludwig Lachmann. These three scholars differ in their
understanding of entrepreneurs and the role they play in
the economy (Gloria-Palermo, 1999; Vaughn, 1994). We
describe and provide illustrative examples of these three
forms of student entrepreneurs, which we label the Rocker,
the Arbitrageur, and the Imaginator. While all student
entrepreneurs may love what they do and their values,
identities, or circumstances compel them to engage in
entrepreneurial activity, major differences exist between
these entrepreneurs and the types of ventures they start.

The Rocker
Joseph Schumpeter was perhaps the first modern
scholar to make a significant contribution to the theory
of entrepreneurship (Hughes, 1993; Praag, 1999). He saw
entrepreneurs as heroic figures who disrupt the prevailing
equilibrium at rare and irregular intervals (Schumpeter,
1934). He believed that though new inventions are
“trivially and abundantly available and known to all sorts of
people” in society (Witt, 1995: 219), entrepreneurs have the
unique ability to combine these inventions with available
resources to introduce new innovations in products,
process, markets, resources, and organization (Schumpeter,
1942). He argued that innovative entrepreneurs conceived
new resource combinations to capture profits, which
subsequently attracts imitators and brings the system back
to a state of equilibrium (Schumpeter, 1934).
We refer to student entrepreneurs who perform
such functions as the Rockers. They identify a commonly
available invention (e.g., the Internet) and combine it
with other resources (e.g., their friends) to introduce new
innovations (e.g., social networking websites such as
MySpace and Facebook). Their business germinates from
their interest in a “cool” technology that they believe can

NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2017

37

New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 20 [2017], No. 1, Art. 5

be used in new ways. These student entrepreneurs usually
start with limited resources that they recombine in new ways
to introduce innovative products and services that disrupt the
prevailing equilibrium and “rock the boat.” In time these new
products and services engender entirely new industries or
fields that are likely to attract imitators. The Rockers, driven by
the pursuit of profit, prefer to exit before the imitators move
in or other newer technologies threaten their business.
Therefore, student entrepreneurs need to invest time to
remain competitive in the industry and bring innovative
products to the market. It would probably not be incorrect
to describe Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook, as a
geek who loved computers. When he “starts a programming
project, all else takes a backseat. He doesn’t eat, doesn’t
sleep, doesn’t talk to friends” (Grynbaum, 2004). He used his
knowledge of computers and the Internet to develop new
innovative products and services (his first one was when
he was in high school) before introducing Facebook to a
receptive student audience in February 2004 during his
undergraduate days at Harvard. From there Facebook quickly
spread to other universities with about 1.6 million monthly U.S.
visitors in 2006 (Delaney, Buckman, & Guth, 2006). Reportedly,
he turned down a $750M buyout offer from Yahoo, holding out
instead for as much as $2B. Like a typical Rocker, Zuckerberg
started with very limited resources, used a technology that was
commonly available then (in 2004), and combined it with an
idiosyncratic resource—his social network, to start a company
that attracted significant venture capital funding in 2005
($13 million), and is pursuing “serious discussion[s]” to sell his
company to the largest bidder (Delaney et al., 2006).

identified by them tend to be so context-specific that they
usually do not even appear on the radar of larger and less
proximate providers.
A relatively large number of student entrepreneurs can
be classified as arbitrageurs. They identify needs that local
businesses are unable or unwilling to meet at a reasonable
and acceptable price. The solutions crafted to fill market
gaps are initially small in scale and limited in scope.
The small scale and local scope tends to limit resource
requirements, enabling student entrepreneurs to operate
relatively independently from resource suppliers (Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978), which promotes flexibility and quickens
their entry into and exit from different economic activities.
Insomnia Cookies is an example of a venture begun
by an Arbitrageur student entrepreneur who discovered
existing opportunities and met market needs not provided
by other parties. Started at the University of Pennsylvania
in 2003 by a junior, Seth Berkowitz, Insomnia Cookies
provides cookies and beverages to students at late-night
hours. By offering students a warm home-cooked food
option during night hours, Berkowitz addressed a market
need largely ignored by existing businesses in town. Aware
of the fact that students craved convenient food late at
night when they study or party, Berkowitz recognized
an opportunity that was unmet and exploited it to offer
cookies and (non-alcoholic) drinks right at students’
doorsteps. Berkowitz’s business was based on his unique
knowledge of student needs.
As undergrads, we figured out what was missing from the

The Arbitrageur

perfect college experience: dependable late-night food

During the past four decades, no economic theorist has
devoted more attention to the entrepreneur than Kirzner.
He views the entrepreneur as an arbitrageur who, through
superior alertness, addresses the needs of customers
not yet realized by existing providers (Kirzner, 1973).
Because these opportunities are readily identifiable by
entrepreneurs who discover opportunities through their
unique ability of alertness, entrepreneurs do not bear
the risk of making a mistake in identifying opportunities
(Kirzner, 1982). Further, Kirzner’s entrepreneurs seek
opportunities that can be easily exploited by buying
low and selling high, and so require no or negligible
capital investment (Hébert & Link, 1982; Kirzner, 1973).
These entrepreneurs derive their advantage from having
good knowledge of the place and time they live in (“tacit
knowledge”; Hayek, 1945; Polanyi, 1966). The needs

delivery. It seems that every night at about the same time,
students get hungry, either because they study hard, they
party hard, or both.…As you probably know, the only food
available at night (without having to trek to the market) is
greasy and heavy. Insomnia Cookies was born out of our
dislike of heavy meals late at night, our love of food delivery,
and our realization that by the time we got hungry at night,
nothing was open. (http://www.insomniacookies.com/
aboutus.aspx)

Today, Berkowitz’s business has expanded to seven
U.S. university campuses. Other Arbitrageurs have followed
in Berkowitz’s footsteps and started businesses that
provide late-night snack options to students in different
campuses. Because Arbitrageurs meet local needs and are
not dependent on resource providers, starting these new
business is relatively easy.
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Since these businesses usually have a short service-topayment cycle, exit cost is not high. Arbitrageurs can exit
any time without a significant loss of capital. Low exit cost
associated with these businesses is an attractive feature for
students who are vulnerable to fluctuating demands on
their time because of coursework, schedule conflicts, and
career instability.

The Imaginator
Though Ludwig Lachmann is one of the central figures in
Austrian economics, his paradigm for entrepreneurship
has been introduced to management and organizational
scholars only in recent years (Chiles & Choi, 2000; Chiles
et al., 2007). According to Lachmann, entrepreneurs
imagine possible futures, choose among these mental
creations, and plan on how to achieve the desired future.
He views the entrepreneur as a creative actor, as someone
who devises a new organization to fulfill his vision for
the future (Lachmann, 1976). In pursuing their plans,
entrepreneurs usually have to invest their own resources
and get other people to invest their resources as well.
Imaginators continuously create and exploit opportunities
through bundling and rebundling resources in different
ways (Lachmann, 1986). They are driven by their creative
imagination and passion for the artifacts they create. These
entrepreneurs are usually loyal to the businesses they
start and interested in staying with the businesses and
growing them, usually not selling even if an opportunity
presents itself. They love their business and derive personal
satisfaction from the fulfillment of their dreams.
Among the most prominent examples of this type
of student entrepreneur is Michael Dell. He started Dell
computers in his dorm room at the University of Texas with
a simple idea of providing affordable personal computers
to college students. He believed in the possibility of a
direct relationship between the computer manufacturer
and the customer and passionately worked to change
the existing supply chain structure in the PC industry to
become a low-cost provider of customized computer
systems. Though he had limited resources and started
small (with about $1000 in 1984), his vision was big and
had far-reaching consequences for the entire PC industry.
He stayed with the company through good and bad
times, and, even today, Dell, one of the richest people in
the world, is the active CEO of Dell Computers. Typical of
an Imaginator, Dell created a multi-billion dollar company
from nothing and remains closely associated with his
company to this day.
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Though not every student entrepreneur classified
as an Imaginator becomes as successful as Dell, what
distinguishes these student entrepreneurs from others is
their beliefs in their ideas and their willingness to stick with
them through thick and thin. Imaginators, however, do not
follow their visions blindly. They are sensitive to changes
in external conditions that may influence the competition
in their industries and are open to changing their vision
as well as their plans to achieve them as circumstances
change. Further, since Imaginators invest their own
resources in launching new businesses, they struggle to
maintain course schedules and often skip classes as they
spend more time strategizing about different sources for
investment. They aim to get high returns before exiting.
The above discussion highlights three types of
student entrepreneurs and outlines major differences in
their motivations and behaviors to define, evaluate, and
exploit opportunities.

Student Entrepreneurship and Challenges
for Stakeholders
In this section, we identify and discuss some challenges
that might arise for the different stakeholders due to
student entrepreneurship. These challenges frequently
evolve from differences in the traditional objectives
associated with centers of education like schools
and colleges and the desires and goals of student
entrepreneurs. They also derive from the diverse
personalities, agendas, incentives, and values of teachers,
university administrators, and student entrepreneurs, as
well as the newness of student entrepreneurship.
Student entrepreneurship, like other forms of
entrepreneurship, requires a significant time commitment
(Katz & Green, 2007). Of course, for the student committing
time to developing and growing a new business is likely to
be more beneficial than engaging in many other traditional
activities associated with student life such as partying or
working in a low-skill job (Hanson & Engs, 1992). However,
engagement in business activities as a student presents a
problem for university management (Ndirangu & Bosire,
2004). The conventional university mission is focused on
scholarship and service to society (Stahler & Tash, 1994).
The large time commitment required to start or manage a
new business is likely to interfere with students’ academic
progress, which may adversely affect their long-term
academic pursuits and achievements.
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To some, student entrepreneurship holds the promise
of improving students’ knowledge about the business world.
Many people believe that being in two places at the same
time (the university and the business world) helps student
entrepreneurs translate the theoretical knowledge they get
in the classroom into practical application and their business
experience in running their own firms into knowledge that
they can bring back to the classroom (Ridder & Sijde, 2006).
The learning environment of student entrepreneurs is not
confined just to the classroom or a textbook, but expands to
include the market where competitive, productive, social, and
political forces intersect (Chagas & Silva, 1997).
Yet, this emphasis on realism is problematic for faculty.
Today, a large number of faculty members in business
schools have always been in the academic world and never
held a “real” job (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002). There are even fewer
faculty members who have entrepreneurial experience. Most
university instructors completed a rigorous doctoral program
because of their passion for learning and teach courses that
they love. Their knowledge is largely theoretical, based on
books and published papers. Student entrepreneurs are
seldom interested in theoretical knowledge (Fiet, 2001). They
are interested in understanding how the information they
are being provided in classes applies to their business. Faculty
with no entrepreneurial experience may find it difficult to
make the connection between their theoretical knowledge
and students’ businesses (Aronsson, 2004), potentially
reducing the student entrepreneur’s interest in the subject.
Student entrepreneurship can also present problems
for students who are not starting or managing their own
business. Many business school courses require students to
work in teams (Baldwin, Bedell, & Johnson, 1997), typically
three to five students, on a specific project. Students who
work with student entrepreneurs on projects may find
that the time and effort they spent on the group work was
appropriated by their entrepreneurial colleague for his/her
business without their permission or knowledge. Though
these concerns can be somewhat alleviated by having
students sign confidentiality agreements, a large part of the
knowledge generated in these projects may be uncodifiable
(Katz et al., 2000). In some situations, student entrepreneurs
may not even consciously remember that the information
they are using in their businesses was developed as part of a
group project. Thus, working with student entrepreneurs in
course projects may put other students at risk of providing
free research and consulting service without any direct
economic benefit to themselves.

Discussion and Future Research Implications
The concept of student entrepreneurship has gained
recognition and popularity in our society. The objective
of this article has been to arouse scholarly interest in the
phenomenon of student entrepreneurship. We consider
student entrepreneurship to be a particularly exciting and
fruitful research topic and it is our hope that this article will
bring us a step closer toward legitimizing and encouraging
student entrepreneurship as a field of research.
The working definition of student entrepreneurship
put forward in this article is intended to facilitate a more
detailed examination of the two components of student
entrepreneurship, namely the student element and the
entrepreneurship element. Our discussion highlights
the need to better understand the domain of student
entrepreneurship. We believe future empirical and
conceptual work will help establish a more comprehensive
picture of student entrepreneurship.
Many of the issues explored in this article are typical
of any new field of research: the need to draw boundaries
so as to delimit scope and clarify whether it really can be
an independent field of research, and the need to identify
differences within the field. To conclude, we will elaborate
on topics and issues we consider important in order to
advance our understanding of student entrepreneurship:
student entrepreneurship as an independent field of research,
assessing the impact of student entrepreneurship, and
clarifying the different forms of student entrepreneurship.
One of the most controversial issues we foresee is
whether student entrepreneurship can be a legitimate and
independent field of research. Some may consider student
entrepreneurship a subcategory of entrepreneurship,
in which the student is a just a subject to study and test
entrepreneurial phenomena. In this article, we have tried to
identify the distinctive domain of student entrepreneurship
and to distinguish it from other forms of entrepreneurship.
We argue that student entrepreneurship differs from other
forms of entrepreneurship as it combines studentship and
entrepreneurship, two traditionally incongruent concepts.
We believe that student entrepreneurship deserves
considerable attention as a scholarly phenomenon. It has
enormous potential to inform and enhance the field of
entrepreneurship as well as the study of higher education,
as it provides an excellent opportunity to challenge and
rethink our conventional views and assumptions about
both entrepreneurship and higher education.
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Assessing the impact of student entrepreneurship
on the different stakeholders will be a great challenge
for researchers, educators, and administrators. The
real problem may not be the measurement of the
performance of the business started by a student
entrepreneur, but how to quantify and measure the overall
impact of student entrepreneurship. More effort must
be made to develop useful and meaningful measures
that capture the impact of student entrepreneurship
and reflect the objectives pursued by the different
stakeholders. Considering the attention that student
entrepreneurship has received in the last few years in
popular media and the establishment of new institutes
and centers to encourage entrepreneurship on campuses,
it is clear that more research is needed to understand and
measure its performance outcomes and impact on all the
stakeholders involved.
This article emphasizes the many forms of student
entrepreneurship by identifying three different types of
student entrepreneurs. Our proposed typology serves only
to illustrate the key differences that might exist among three
types of student entrepreneurs. It is certainly not the final
solution to understanding student entrepreneurship and
future research may present other typologies. A promising
area of research lies in empirically testing our proposed
typology and identifying their various antecedents, such
as individual, organizational, cultural, and economic
variables. This poses additional interesting questions.
Assuming that student entrepreneurship, like conventional
entrepreneurship, involves various stages (e.g., an intention
formation stage, a start-up stage, a growth stage, etc.), how
do the different types of student entrepreneurs navigate
these stages differently? How do the various antecedents
affect student entrepreneurship at different stages? One
could argue that the common strand of studentship would
lead these entrepreneurs to behave in similar ways during
the different stages. On the other hand, contextual and
motivational differences may influence the various types of
student entrepreneurs in different ways at every stage.
It is noteworthy that this is the first article exclusively
devoted to student entrepreneurship. We believe that a
wide variety of research questions requires further attention.
Student entrepreneurship can benefit from research drawing
from multiple disciplinary perspectives and literatures, such
as that on entrepreneurship, higher education, and teaching
pedagogy. We conclude with a list of questions that provide
only a snapshot of important issues.
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• How do student entrepreneurs balance their
academic and business goals simultaneously?
• Should universities encourage student
entrepreneurship? If yes, how?
• Future research is warranted to explore whether
some colleges are more or less likely to foster
student entrepreneurship. If so, why?
• What is the role, if any, of individual teachers in
student entrepreneurship?
Most empirical research findings suggest the connection
between university entrepreneurship programs and
entrepreneurial activity, in a way to investigate how
universities can foster student entrepreneurs (Souitaris,
Zerbinati, & Al-Laham, 2007). Examining six Iranian
universities, Karimi et al. (2016) found that elective
courses offered at these universities have positive impact
on the students’ entrepreneurial intentions. Student
entrepreneurs look for practical experience and, therefore,
universities have moved away from classroom settings to
action-oriented approaches in teaching entrepreneurship
(Rasmussen and Sørheim, 2006). This evidence supports
the premise that student entrepreneurs acquire
entrepreneurial skills and knowledge while studying the
entrepreneurial courses. Forbes (2015) reports that over
the years, high numbers of student entrepreneurs come
from top-tier universities and colleges, such as Cooper
Union and Stanford University. However, universities
can foster student entrepreneurs by also hiring faculty
with business experience who will not only impact the
entrepreneurial skills of students, but also provide them
with much needed network connections to start a new
venture. Universities may also change their policies to
influence the amount of resources students entrepreneurs
are eligible to receive while enrolled at the university
(Bailetti, 2011). Future research should explore how
instructors can go beyond their roles of teaching and
research to increase the number of student entrepreneurs.
Scholars agree that cultural and social norms are
important antecedents of entrepreneurial intentions
(Kwong & Thompson, 2016). The GUESSS (Sieger,
Fueglistaller, & Zellweger, 2014) findings suggest that
students entrepreneurs in developed industrialized
countries are attractive to and looked favorably
upon by their “important others.” Self-employment is
becoming more common in Europe, with nearly two in
three students intending to start their own businesses
immediately upon graduation. Future research should
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explore whether cultural differences influence the
motivations and processes of student entrepreneurship
differently across countries. As mentioned above,
student entrepreneurs are motivated by personal gains
but through their new business, they also provide jobs
and decrease unemployment. Future research should
explore the link between student entrepreneurship and
economic development, and examine ways that student
entrepreneurship can contribute to regional development.

in this study will attract other scholars and educators
to this field. The level of scholarly attention on student
entrepreneurship is far behind its practice. We believe
that the answers to some of the questions outlined
above, and the further discussion they engender, will help
motivate more attention and rigorous inquiry in this field.
We look forward to other scholars joining in the effort to
understand the complex, but interesting, phenomenon of
student entrepreneurship.

We hope that the focus on student entrepreneurship

ENDNOTE
Studentship has traditionally been associated with academic goals such as acquiring and learning new knowledge and
skills; entrepreneurship generally refers to financial objectives such as running a profitable business.
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The Role of Trust in Social Entrepreneurship:
A Case Study of Global Brigades
Laura Tack
Mark Simon
Ruihua Joy Jiang

S

ocial entrepreneurship literature acknowledges that social
capital is vital to the success of social entrepreneurship
efforts and trust is integral to the process of building social
capital. However, there has been limited research on trust itself
in social entrepreneurship literature. This article aims to begin
filling this gap by utilizing a specific social entrepreneurship
initiative to illustrate the role of trust in social entrepreneurship
efforts. It describes the model of trust developed by Sheppard
and Sherman and the social entrepreneurship initiative,
Global Brigades. The article discusses the relationships
between the parties involved in the initiative and applies
Sheppard and Sherman’s model to these relationships. It
illustrates the importance of trust to social entrepreneurship
efforts, as well as the need for additional research regarding
social entrepreneurship and trust.
Keywords: social entrepreneurship; trust; international social
entrepreneurship; case study; indigenous people; poverty
Social entrepreneurship has generated much interest in
the private, public, and not-for-profit sectors (Jiao, 2011).
Although there are many definitions for this concept
(Jiao, 2011), social entrepreneurship can broadly be
described as “a process involving the innovative use
and combination of resources to pursue opportunities
to catalyze social change and/or address social needs”
(Mair & Marti, 2006, p. 37). Many variables determine the
success of a social entrepreneurship initiative. One such
variable is social capital, which is prominently addressed
in social entrepreneurship literature. Social capital is the
“actual and potential assets embedded in relationships
among individuals, communities, networks, and societies”
(Mair & Marti, 2006, p. 41). Social capital includes access
to resources, information, and support; trust; respect; and
friendliness (Mair & Marti, 2006).
It is well established in social entrepreneurship
literature that social capital is vital to the success of social
entrepreneurship efforts. Jiao’s (2011) conceptual model
for social entrepreneurship indicates that social capital
is positively related to both the creation and survival of
social entrepreneurship initiatives. Mair and Marti (2006)

state that social capital helps social entrepreneurs relieve
social problems and enter the public sphere. Scheiber
(2014) finds that social capital allows social entrepreneurs
to develop a better understanding of complex social
problems, which results in more effective social
entrepreneurship initiatives.
Entrepreneurship literature acknowledges that trust is
integral to the process of building social capital (Bogren &
von Friedrichs, 2016; Zhang & Hamilton, 2010). However,
social entrepreneurship literature largely neglects the
analysis of trust itself (Curtis, Herbst, & Gumkovska, 2010).
This is not due to lack of relevance; trust is undeniably
important in social entrepreneurship efforts. Trust
facilitates cooperative behavior, decreases detrimental
conflict, reduces transaction costs, promotes network
relations, enables swift formulation of ad hoc work groups,
and promotes effective responses to crises (Rousseau,
Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998); all of which are critical in
social entrepreneurship efforts. Scheiber’s (2014) analysis
of 27 social entrepreneurs in Rio de Janeiro found trust
to be instrumental in increasing participation in social
entrepreneurship initiatives, gaining access to additional
members of the target population, and achieving greater
levels of effectiveness and social impact. Nevertheless, very
little existing social entrepreneurship literature explicitly
focuses on trust.
This article aims to begin filling this gap by utilizing
a specific social entrepreneurship initiative to illustrate
the necessity of trust in social entrepreneurship efforts.
The article begins with a description of the model of trust
developed by Sheppard and Sherman (1998). It then
describes the social entrepreneurship initiative, Global
Brigades. The article next discusses the relationships
between the parties involved in the initiative and applies
Sheppard and Sherman’s model to these relationships.
The discussion that concludes this article illustrates the
importance of trust to social entrepreneurship efforts, as
well as the need for additional research regarding social
entrepreneurship and trust.
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The initial research for this case study was completed
by two of the authors as they participated in a social
entrepreneurship initiative organized by Global Business
Brigades, a program dedicated to creating and sustaining
economic empowerment within impoverished
communities in various third-world countries. As
participants in the brigade, the authors spent a week
providing financial literacy workshops and individualized
business consultation in the village of Ipeti Emberá,
Panama. This experience gave the authors valuable
firsthand knowledge of the parties involved in this social
entrepreneurship initiative, as well as the relationships and
forms of trust between these parties.

The Grammars of Trust and the
Corresponding Model
Sheppard and Sherman (1998) argue that trust can
be understood as four separate and ordered forms
determined by two dimensions of a given relationship:
relational form and relational depth. These four forms,
which are informed by Fiske’s (1990) four elemental
forms of human relationships, are shallow dependence,
deep dependence, shallow interdependence, and deep
interdependence (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998).
Shallow dependence is characterized by a
unidirectional dependency and limited, often shortterm, relational depth (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998).
One example of shallow dependence is the relationship
between a shopper and an online clothing store. The
main risks associated with shallow dependence are
(1) unreliability, which is the risk that one party will
not behave as expected and (2) indiscretion, which
is the risk that one party will inappropriately utilize or
disclose sensitive information (Sheppard & Sherman,
1998). Sheppard and Sherman (1998) contend that the
appropriate mechanism to produce trust in a shallow
dependence relationship is deterrence based. This
mechanism may involve penalties imposed on parties
that perform unreliably or counter to the agreement, or
costs of discontinuing the partnership that outweigh the
benefits of acting in a distrustful manner (Sheppard &
Sherman, 1998).
Deep dependence describes a relationship with
intensive, often long-lasting, relational depth in which
the trustee’s behavior is outside the trustor purview
and consequently challenging to monitor (Sheppard
& Sherman, 1998). An example of a deep dependence
relationship is the relationship between a boss and an
46

employee. The risks associated with deep dependence
include the aforementioned risks as well as (1) cheating,
which is when one party utilizes information asymmetry
to the dependent party’s disadvantage; (2) neglect, which
involves the omission of one party’s interests; (3) abuse,
which occurs when one party uses its ability to determine
the fate of a second party to impose additional costs; and
(4) self-esteem, which can occur when one party’s sense of
self is directly related to the deep relationship (Sheppard &
Sherman, 1998). The appropriate trust mechanism to use
in deep dependence relationships is the evocation of a
sense of obligation (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998).
Shallow interdependence describes a relationship
with limited, often short-term, relational depth in which
the achievement of desired goals depends on effective
coordination between parties (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998).
One example of shallow interdependence is the relationship
between members of a short-term project team. The risks
associated with shallow interdependence are unreliability;
indiscretion; and poor coordination, which is the risk that
coordination will not be rapid or effective enough to be
successful (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998). The appropriate
trust production mechanism in shallow interdependence
relationships is “active discovery through communication
and research” (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998).
The fourth form is deep interdependence, which is
characterized by intense, often long-term, relational depth
and interdependent parties (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998).
An example of deep interdependence is the relationship
between husband and wife. Deep interdependence
is subject to all of the aforementioned risks as well as
misanticipation, which is the risk that without detailed
instructions, one party will be unable to anticipate
the needs or actions of the other party (Sheppard &
Sherman, 1998). The necessary trust mechanism in deep
interdependence relationships is internalization, which
occurs when each party adopts the other party’s beliefs
and preferences (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998).
The model developed by Sheppard and Sherman
(1998), summarized in Table 1, is useful in understanding
the production of trust in multiple types of social
entrepreneurship relationships. This article utilizes a
case study of Global Brigades, an international nonprofit organization, to consider these forms of trust in
the context of a contemporary social entrepreneurship
initiative. As discussed below, Global Brigades is a nonprofit organization that empowers small, impoverished
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Table 1. Summary of Relevant Components of Sheppard and Sherman’s Model of Trust
Form of Dependence

Risks

Mechanism for Trust

Relationship Example

Shallow dependence

Unreliability
Indescretion

Deterrence

Shopper and online
clothing store

Deep sependence

Cheating
Neglect
Abuse
Self-esteem

Obligation

Boss and employee

Shallow interdependence

Poor coordination

Discovery

Members of short-term
project team

Deep interdependence

Misanticipation

Internalization

Husband and wife

communities to gain medical, financial, and environmental
self-sufficiency. The work of Global Brigades in the
Panamanian village of Ipeti Emberá provides a very
interesting platform for the discussion of Sheppard and
Sherman’s (1998) forms of trust and social entrepreneurship
for two reasons. First, Ipeti Emberá simultaneously maintains
three relationships: one with the national government, one
with Global Brigades, and one with student volunteers.
Second, due to Global Brigades regulations, the relationship
between the village and the organization is very different
from the relationship between the village and the student
volunteers. As a result, these three relationships allow three
distinct forms of trust to be observed in just one case study.
Because this case provides insight into three of the four
forms of trust, the findings of this article can be adapted and
applied to many social entrepreneurship initiatives, even
when situational details vary.
This article will discuss each relationship and the resulting
form of trust. Namely, we will discuss deep dependence
in regards to the village and the national government,
deep interdependence in regards to the village and Global
Brigades, and shallow interdependence in regards to the
village and student volunteers. These three forms of trust are
particularly relevant to social entrepreneurship initiatives.
First, deep dependence is relevant to social entrepreneurship
because the need for social entrepreneurship is often
created by the failure of a deep dependence relationship,

such as the relationship between a community and its
government. Second, deep interdependence is relevant to
social entrepreneurship because social entrepreneurs often
invest significant resources into the initiatives, and the target
populations rely on the resulting assistance. Finally, shallow
interdependence is relevant to social entrepreneurship
initiatives because such initiatives often involve individuals
who participate without fully internalizing the social
entrepreneur’s dedication or investments; this can produce
a shallow interdependence relationship between these
individuals and the target population.
The fourth form of trust, shallow dependence, is not
present in this case study. The intensive nature of Global
Brigades prevents such a relationship from forming; the
brigades are week-long immersive experiences, and the
student volunteers are responsible for funding their own
travel and accommodation expenses. As a result, the
students are both financially and emotionally invested
in their brigade; they rely on the villagers’ participation
and cooperation to achieve the satisfaction of having a
successful brigade, just as the villagers rely on the students’
efforts. This situation is, as we will discuss later in this
article, not unusual. Social entrepreneurship initiatives
rarely result in shallow dependence relationships because
both parties are often invested in the outcome, and must
rely on each other to achieve success.
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The Social Entrepreneurship Initiative:
Global Brigades
Global Brigades is an “international non-profit that
empowers communities to meet their health and
economic goals through university volunteers and local
teams” (Global Brigades, 2015d). The organization identifies
impoverished villages within poverty-stricken nations and
determines the specific needs of each community. These
needs may be medical, architectural, entrepreneurial, etc.
Global Brigades then mobilizes students and professors
from universities around the world, sending them on
week-long trips to these communities. Each trip, or
“brigade,” is customized to provide for the community’s
specific needs. The students, also known as “brigaders,” are
encouraged to join brigades that utilize their skill sets and
education. For example, a brigade comprised of medical
students and professors would be sent to a community
requiring medical assistance.

History
Global Brigades traces its roots to 2003, when a lone
medical brigade travelled to Honduras (Global Brigades,
2015a). The brigade was mainly comprised of students
and doctors from the Midwest United States who spent
their time in Honduras providing medical care to members
of rural communities (Global Brigades, 2015a). Later in
2003, one of the original brigade members helped found
Global Medical Relief, Inc., working with American medical
students to bring good, sustainable medical care to rural
communities in developing countries (Global Brigades,
2015a). Global Medical Relief, Inc. was disbanded in 2005,
but one of the original Honduras brigade members
continued its mission through a new organization
entitled Global Medical Brigades (Global Brigades,
2015a). The growth of Global Medical Brigades led to the
inception of Global Brigades, Inc., a nonprofit corporation
headquartered in the United States. Like its predecessors,
Global Brigades utilized student volunteers to provide
medical services to impoverished communities in
Honduras. As the organization grew, the medical brigades
noted additional needs within the communities they were
serving, and expanded to include Business, Water, Public
Health, Microfinance, Environmental, Architecture, and
Law Brigades throughout 2007 and 2008 (Global Brigades,
2015a). During the following years, Global Brigades
welcomed universities from multiple countries and began
serving additional impoverished nations.
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Today, Global Brigades is comprised of multiple
independent legal entities, each of which is a member of
the Global Brigades Association (Global Brigades, 2015b).
These entities are based in the United States, Canada,
Germany, Switzerland, Ireland, the United Kingdom,
Ghana, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua (Global
Brigades, 2015b). Within the Global Brigades Association,
each entity has equal representation as a member of the
Board of Directors (Global Brigades, 2015b).

Business Model
As Global Brigades grew, it recognized the need for its
“holistic model,” which ensures each brigade complements
the others (Global Brigades, 2015a). For example, a Water
Brigade may help a community install a clean water supply
in response to a Medical Brigade’s indication of such a
need. The holistic model also includes a clear exit strategy
to be executed once a community becomes sustainably
self-sufficient (Global Brigades, 2015a). Global Brigades
has also implemented organization-wide best practices
and designed universal marketing kits to streamline the
creation of additional Global Brigades chapters (Global
Brigades, 2015a).
As one of the largest student-led volunteer relief
organizations in the world, Global Brigades receives the vast
majority of its income from the volunteers themselves. In the
months leading up to a brigade, each brigader is responsible
for financing brigade expenses in advance. The revenue
received from brigaders themselves is supplemented by
contributions from organizations and individuals who would
like to finance specific Global Brigade projects, as well as the
organization’s overhead expenses.

The Relationships within the Social
Entrepreneurship Initiative
Ipeti Emberá and the Panamanian Government
The village visited by the authors, Ipeti Emberá, is a rural
community comprised of approximately 85 families. Its
inhabitants are members of the Emberá ethnic group.
This indigenous group is one of the largest in Panama, but
constitutes only 0.9 percent of the country’s population
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). Unlike the mestizo
(mixed indigenous and white) population in Panama
that generally embraces contemporary Hispanic culture,
the indigenous population of Panama—composed of
multiple distinct and unique ethnicities, including the
Ngabe, Kuna, Emberá, and Bugle people—tends to place
a much stronger emphasis on the history and culture of their
respective tribes (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015).
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Due to these and other complex societal and historical
reasons, relations in Panama between the mestizo population
and indigenous communities are strained, and the nation’s
indigenous people are often treated as second-class citizens.
As a result, while the non-indigenous rural poor have had
some success in escaping poverty by migrating to urban
areas, the indigenous populations constitute an increasing
portion of the nation’s poor and extreme poor (Central
Intelligence Agency, 2015). Panama has the second worst
income distribution in Latin America, and government
attempts to alleviate poverty and inequality have been largely
ineffective (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015).
The poverty statistics for the village of Ipeti Emberá
are not known because a high illiteracy rate and lack
of financial education preclude many members from
recording their income. However, it is reasonable to
assume the community’s poverty level closely resembles
official statistics, which state 96.7 percent of Panama’s
indigenous population falls below the poverty level of
$3.13 per day (Global Brigades, 2014).
The community’s government follows a general policy
of autonomy and separation from the outside world and the
Panamanian government allows the community to conduct
its own affairs with very little assistance or interference. This
occurs for many reasons. The most significant reason for the
separation between the village and the government is the
cultural differences and friction, described above, between the
mestizo population and the indigenous population. However,
observed lack of assistance has further embittered villagers
against the government. For example, the government once
promised to send agriculture experts to the village to assist and
instruct the agrarian community. The visit was supposed to
last for many days, but the experts arrived and left within one
hour. In addition, the teachers in government-funded schools
teach in Spanish, a second language to the children of Ipeti
Emberá. These children do not receive additional assistance
or instruction due to the language barrier; instead, they are
marginalized and often fall behind as a result. Another example
involves the infrastructure surrounding Ipeti Emberá. Due to
its close proximity to the Columbian border, the Panamanian
government intentionally leaves the region’s roads in disrepair
to hinder drug smugglers who may attempt to escape
pursuing police. Due to the lack of support provided by the
Panamanian government, the vast majority of community
problems are solved within Ipeti Emberá without assistance
from individuals or institutions outside of the village (Global
Brigades, 2015c).

Ipeti Emberá and Global Brigades
Global Brigades spends ample time initially evaluating a
community and its needs before initiating brigades to that
community. First, Global Brigades communicates with the
community to determine if it is needful of and receptive to
external assistance. Then Global Brigades works with the
community to assess which type of assistance—medical,
dental, business, etc.—would be most beneficial to the
community. Once the community and Global Brigades have
agreed on a program, the Global Brigade initiatives can begin.
Each community typically receives two week-long
brigades each year. These are supplemented by in-country
Global Brigades staff members who establish weekly
communication with each community. In this way, Global
Brigades can provide ongoing support to a community until
it becomes self-sufficient. Self-sufficiency is accomplished
in a unique way for each aspect of life. Concerning water,
self-sufficiency may mean t hat the community is capable of
maintaining its own clean water system. In a business sense,
self-sufficiency may be achieved when the community
is knowledgeable enough to make informed financial
decisions and able to run its own community cooperative.
Once a community is self-sufficient, Global Brigades ceases
to send brigades and offers only minimal support.
The authors of this article took part in a Global
Business Brigade (GBB), a subset of Global Brigades
designed to help communities in an economic capacity.
GBB utilizes three tools to improve the economic
standing of communities such as Ipeti Emberá: credit and
savings cooperatives, financial literacy workshops, and
personalized business development and consulting.
Credit and Savings Cooperative. GBB helps each
community establish a Credit and Savings Cooperative.
GBB provides the initial start-up capital and teaches elected
leaders of the cooperative how to manage the operation.
These cooperatives, which are essentially banks run by the
community, introduce much-needed investment capital
into the community and enable small businesses and
individuals in the community to take out loans. Any profits
from the loan operations are reinvested in the community.
At the time of the authors’ brigade, the Ipeti Emberá
cooperative had 21 members and 7 outstanding loans
totaling approximately $265. Although the interest from
the loans was simply increasing the cooperative’s capital at
the time of the brigade, cooperative members expressed a
desire to use the interest income to purchase a community
vehicle at some point in the future.
THE ROLE OF TRUST IN SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
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The Credit and Savings Cooperative also entices
members to save their money by offering an interest
rate of 1 percent per month. As a culture, the indigenous
people of Panama do not embrace the concept of saving.
The prevailing wisdom is a type of monetary carpe
diem: you don’t know when you’ll have money again, so
you better spend it while you have it. Combatting this
ingrained way of thinking and encouraging villagers to
save is one of GBB’s main goals.
Financial Literacy Workshops. GBB has outlined a series
of financial literacy topics to teach community members how
to make financial goals, create budgets, save money, plan
for financial emergencies, and obtain loans. This curriculum
is designed to be taught, bit by bit, by multiple brigades. In
each community, wherever in the curriculum one brigade
ends, the next brigade begins. At the time of the authors’
brigade, the community members had only been exposed
to the first portion of the curriculum, which included making
financial goals and examining spending habits. The education
in Ipeti Emberá outside of these financial literacy workshops is
minimal due to a lack of resources. Many community members
strive to provide their children with a better education than
they themselves had access to; few individuals within the
community have more than an elementary-level education,
and approximately 50 percent of the community’s population
is illiterate (Global Brigades, 2015c).
Personalized Business Development and Consultation.
GBB enables brigade members to provide business
development and consulting to entrepreneurs who have
been previously identified by and worked with GBB. A
business brigade is divided into smaller teams, each of
which is responsible for providing business consultation
to a small business within the community. Just as
multiple brigades will come to the same community to
teach financial literacy workshops, each small business
will receive guidance from multiple small teams. In Ipeti
Emberá, essentially every community member is selfemployed, as agriculture and craft-making work employs
most of the villagers. The more advanced entrepreneurial
efforts within Ipeti Emberá include a few pig farms and
six small kiosks owned by individuals who sell consumer
goods such as snacks, soda, and trinkets.

Ipeti Emberá and the Authors’ Team
Two key facts should be initially noted. First, each
community receives brigades from chapters around the
world; it is extremely rare for a chapter to visit the same
community more than once. As a result, each brigade
50

will be the first interaction between the community
and the individual brigade members, but not the first
interaction between the community and Global Brigades.
Second, it is very difficult for brigade members to contact
community members after they have left the country.
This restriction in communication has both practical and
regulatory causes. The former concerns the difficulty of
reaching community members, as very few of them have
access to contemporary communication tools. The latter
relates to the Global Brigades policy itself; Global Brigades
discourages communication between the community
and previous brigades due to negative past experiences.
In previous years, Global Brigades allowed brigaders to
contact villagers after they had completed their brigade.
However, while most brigaders promised to remain
dedicated to the community until the villagers’ difficulties
were mitigated, very few students kept their promise. Most
students returned home and became too involved in their
own lives and responsibilities to continue communicating
with community members. The villagers felt abandoned,
and they often blamed Global Brigades. As a result, Global
Brigades has implemented policies that enable it to be the
sole point of contact for all brigade-related matters the
community members may wish to discuss.
The authors (one student and one professor) took part
in a brigade consisting of 12 business students, 2 business
professors, 3 students majoring in Spanish, and 2 Global
Brigades employees. One Global Brigades employee
served as a translator and the other, Kevin, served as a
translator, guide, and overall liaison between the brigaders
and villagers. The brigade was split into three teams. Each
team had two distinct responsibilities: financial literacy
education and small business consultation.
Before the brigades went to the community for the
first time, Kevin gave a presentation that highlighted the
cultural differences between the American brigaders and
the Ipeti Emberá villagers. First, while the majority of the
students spoke only English, the community members
spoke a mix of Spanish and Emberá. Second, although
the students were anxious to get started, the community
members felt no need to hurry. The presentation
encouraged the brigaders to be both patient and flexible,
as the community members did not want to move nearly
as quickly as their American visitors. Third, the presentation
stressed the pride the villagers had in their culture. This
point was reinforced time and time again once the
brigaders met the villagers.
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During the initial meeting between community
members and brigaders, the village leader illustrated
multiple traditions that were maintained for purely cultural
reasons. For example, the Emberá people had lived by
rivers and other sources of water for centuries, and had
learned to raise their buildings on stilts to protect them
from potential flooding. Even though the Ipeti Emberá
community was on ground high enough to provide
protection from all but the most severe flooding, the
community continued to build its structures on stilts to
preserve this cultural tradition. Additionally, almost all
adults in the community, men and women alike, took
great pride in creating traditional Emberá crafts. The
women typically made jewelry and embroidered, while
the men carved wood. Women in the community had
even created an artisan group that sold their crafts to
tourists. Due to the dearth of visitors, members of the
artisan group were overstocked, but they continued to
travel to Panama City once a month to buy supplies to
make additional crafts because they refused to neglect this
aspect of Ipeti Emberá tradition.
Financial Literacy Workshops. As described above, GBB
outlined a series of topics designed to increase financial
literacy within the community. Students within the brigades
were responsible for developing lessons for each of their
designated topics and deciding how best to present these
lessons to community members. During the lessons, the GBB
staff members served only as translators, offering minimal
input. Aside from adhering to various cultural mores, there
was only one recommendation the brigaders were strongly
encouraged to follow: begin each lesson with an icebreaker.
Icebreakers could essentially be anything, as long as they were
designed to establish trust and rapport between the brigaders
and the community members. To further develop camaraderie
between the students and villagers, GBB implemented a “best
friend” component of the financial literacy workshops. At the
beginning of a brigade, each community member chose a
student to be their “best friend.”Throughout the rest of the
week, each brigader was responsible for ensuring, as much as
possible considering the language barrier, that his or her best
friend was following along and understanding the concepts
presented in the workshops.
The authors’ team began each financial literacy
workshop with an icebreaker. One icebreaker progressed
as follows: an imaginary line down the middle of the
floor divided a “yes” side from a “no” side. Kevin made
a statement about anything he wished, and all the

participants—brigaders and villagers—moved to the side
of the floor that responded to the statement properly for
them. Simple statements (e.g., “I like to sing” and “I don’t
like spicy food”) helped both brigaders and villagers realize
that each one of them was an individual with preferences
and desires that could not be dictated by country
and culture. By drawing a line and asking participants
to consistently cross it, the divide between brigaders
and villagers diminished. Even when certain cultural
differences showed themselves (e.g., a desire of the female
villagers to cook and raise children that was not shared
by their American counterparts), the differences were
intriguing instead of alienating. By the end, brigaders and
villagers were suggesting statements and laughing with
each other at the sometimes unexpected results.
As the workshops progressed, the brigaders never
ceased to be amazed by the villagers’ willingness and
ability to learn. The villagers were excited to understand
the brigaders’ financial advice and apply the guidance to
their own lives. A prime example of this occurred when
the brigaders warned against making impulsive purchases.
They recommended creating a shopping list before going
to the store or community kiosk and taking only the
amount of money necessary to purchase items on the
list. The next day, a woman in the group described her
trip to one of the town’s kiosks. She had seen a lovely hair
clip but only had enough money with her to buy food, as
recommended in the workshop. She was consequently
unable to buy the clip. When she returned home and
considered going back to purchase the accessory, she
realized she owned a clip that was almost identical to the
one in the kiosk. She was understandably relieved that the
advice from the workshop prevented her from wasting
money that was better spent on provisions for her family.
The ability to absorb and apply concepts exemplified by
this woman was shared among almost all of the members
of the workshop, and was an encouragement to both
brigaders and villagers.
Personalized Business Development and Consultation.
Each afternoon following the financial literacy workshops,
the teams spent time advising their respective business
owners. The authors were on a team of six assigned to
work with Melania Sarco, the owner of a pig farm named
Cría de Melania. The team assigned to Melania’s business
had received some background information before the
brigade, but their knowledge of Cría de Melania was
minimal. While the team had hoped to gain knowledge
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from Melania during the workshops, this was not possible
because Melania was in a different team’s workshop group.
Additionally, Melania’s “best friend” was not in the business
consultation team, so the team was not able to get to know
her in that regard. Kevin served as the translator for the team
because he had worked with Melania earlier in the year
alongside a different university. Nevertheless, he had shared
little of his prior knowledge of Melania’s case; he did not
want past experiences to dictate present actions.
The meetings with Melania took place in her home. During
the first meeting, the team committed many cultural gaffes
that undermined its members’ relationship with Melania.
For example, when the team went to meet Melania for the
first time, they saw that her home was a hut on stilts with a
thatched roof. Except for a blue tarp that formed one outer wall
of the house, the structure had no walls. Because of this, the
team was able to see Melania sitting inside when they reached
the hut. The students and professor waved and climbed up
the notched log leaning against the side, which served as a
ladder. The team later learned that proper etiquette demanded
calling out to, and being acknowledged by, the home’s
inhabitants before climbing up the log ladder. This process was
essentially equivalent to ringing a doorbell before entering a
house. The team members also inadvertently neglected to
remove their shoes upon entering the domicile, which was a
sign of disrespect. Additionally, the excited team immediately
jumped into rapid-fire questions about Melania and her
business, forgetting the cultural norm of getting to know new
acquaintances on a personal level before discussing practical
matters. Even worse, the team’s first question, which was
designed to help the team gauge Melania’s abilities, concerned
her level of education and whether she was literate. Because
Melania was illiterate, this well-intentioned question seemed
condescending and intrusive.
During their meeting, Melania explained that she
had lived in Ipeti Emberá her entire life and had received
her knowledge of pig farming from her mentor, Lucia,
who had been raising pigs for years. GBB had offered to
give Lucia business consulting services just as Melania
was receiving, but she had refused. In addition to the
knowledge she gained from Lucia, Melania had some
personal experience raising pigs. She started her pig farm
two years before with the hope of generating additional
income to provide basic necessities for her family. She had
previously raised a pig until it grew to be 300 pounds. Her
husband, Ariel, sold the pig without consulting Melania
or her children. Because Ariel was unfamiliar with the
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pig market, he did not realize a fair price for the pig was
approximately $675, and consequently sold the pig for
$125. This unfortunate sale represented a huge setback
for Melania. Because she had invested so much money
in her first pig, she did not have much additional capital
to invest in the business. She had since managed to buy
another pig, but her limited resources prevented her from
feeding it properly, which drastically impaired its ability
to gain weight. Additionally, because she also worked in
agriculture and made artisan crafts to sell to tourists, the
time she had to devote to the pig farm was minimal.
Through many questions and much translation, the
team continued to learn more about Melania’s business.
Kevin suggested Melania take the team to see the pig pen,
and the team readily accepted. The pen itself consisted of
a concrete slab on the ground fenced in by wooden slats.
Melania had many ideas for improvements: she wanted
to install a septic tank nearby, which she estimated would
cost hundreds of dollars. She also wanted to install a pump
that would transport water from a nearby stream uphill
to the pig pen. To protect her pig from the heat, Melania
also wished to buy metal sheeting to form a pig pen roof,
which would cost approximately $90. This would serve as a
temporary solution until Ariel could spare the money and
time necessary to make a higher quality palm frond roof.
During later questioning, Melania described her plans
to expand the pig pen to fit the current adult male pig
and two piglets that would soon be given to Melania
as payment in a breeding agreement. The team was
surprised by this, as the pen had seemed large enough to
fit the male pig and multiple piglets. Further questioning
prompted Melania to revise her original statement and
concede that the current pen was spacious enough to
accommodate three adult pigs. During another discussion,
the team asked whether there were other pigs in the
community with which to breed. Melania responded that
she did not know. Her son, who sat in on each meeting,
stepped in and made it clear there were other male and
female adult pigs nearby, as there were three other pig
farms within and near the community.
Throughout their discussions, the team continued
to question Melania about every aspect of her business.
At one point, Melania asked why the students had so
many questions. She asked if they meant to take her
information and begin a pig farm in the United States. The
students did their best to explain through Kevin that they
needed the information in order to give Melania accurate

NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2017

53

New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 20 [2017], No. 1, Art. 5

recommendations for her pig farm. They thought she must
understand their intentions, as she had previously worked
with another GBB team and had been briefed by GBB
before their arrival. Upon hearing their assurances, Melania
cautiously agreed to proceed.
Throughout the week, the team responsible for Cría de
Melania continued to meet with Melania every afternoon
after the morning workshops had concluded. Each day, the
group traveled three hours in a cramped van to get from
their hostel to the village and back. Each evening they
used this information to devise their plan. The students
worked 16-hour days preparing the financial literacy
workshops, working with villagers, and brainstorming
business development solutions.
By their final morning, the exhausted students
believed they had developed a plan that could help
Melania attain her goals. But they also had a devastating
epiphany: getting Melania to implement the plan would
be even more challenging than creating it. All their work
could come to nothing. As the students reflected on
the week, they realized that they had never developed
Melania’s trust, making it almost a forgone conclusion that
she would never follow their suggestions.
Realizing the problem, the students took many steps
to repair the relationship. To develop better rapport, they
bought Melania a $15 tarp that could serve as a temporary
pig pen roof and provide shade for her pig. They worked
hand in hand with the family to put up the tarp. The students
also made sure to follow cultural norms, such as waiting until
being “invited” before entering Melania’s house and taking
off their shoes once inside. Also, before presenting their
recommendations, they talked to Melania about her culture
and her grandchildren, both of which she was immensely
proud. The students then shared information about their lives.
Before the last day, Melania had worn an almost perpetual
scowl. But on the last day, she was often smiling. The team
realized it was much more likely that Melania would consider
following their suggestions.

Discussion: Application of the Trust Model to the
Social Entrepreneurship Initiative
The model of trust developed by Sheppard and Sherman
(1998) is valued by entrepreneurship literature because
it conceptualizes trust in two dimensions: relational form
and relational depth (Ferguson, Schattke, & Paulin, 2016;
Ulhøi, 2005). An application of this multidimensional
model of trust to the various relationships in the Global

Brigades case illustrates how trust and interparty
relationships play a significant role in the effectiveness
of social entrepreneurship initiatives. For instance, the
relationship between Ipeti Emberá and the Panamanian
government can be characterized as deep dependence.
The villagers did not trust their government due to
the neglect they experienced. The lack of trust in this
relationship forced them to seek assistance from an
external party, Global Brigades.
The relationship between Ipeti Emberá and Global
Brigades can be characterized as deep interdependence.
The villagers and Global Brigades established trust in
their relationship that enabled them to avoid the risk of
misanticipation. In this relationship, each party understood
and identified with the other. This led to coordinated,
effective, and successful initiatives that improved the quality
of life in the village and allowed Global Brigades efforts to
be fruitful. If Global Brigades had not trusted the villagers,
it would not have invested resources in this particular
community. Similarly, if the villagers had not trusted Global
Brigades, they would not have agreed to spend the time
and effort necessary to participate in the GBB initiatives.
The relationship between the villagers and the author’s
team can be characterized as shallow interdependence.
The team established trust with their financial literacy
workshop, which led to more effective lessons and successful
application of the lessons to the villagers’ lives. However,
the authors’ team almost did not establish trust in their
relationship with Melania, which not only would have
prevented their brigade from being successful, but also
would have precluded Melania from implementing advice
that could possibly increase the profitability of her pig farm
and, consequently, the quality of her life.
Strategies of Cultivating and Maintaining
Deep Dependence
Sheppard and Sherman (1998) indicate that the
relationship between a government and its citizens
can often be characterized as deep dependence. As
mentioned previously, one of the risks associated with
deep dependence relationships is neglect. This risk is
realized in the relationship between Ipeti Emberá and the
Panamanian government due to the government’s significant
lack of involvement. On a broad scale, the government
has failed to decrease the prejudice against indigenous
populations. It has also been ineffective in mitigating poverty
or inequality, and has failed to provide opportunities for
indigenous individuals to escape poverty. Concerning Ipeti
THE ROLE OF TRUST IN SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
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Emberá specifically, the lack of attention given to indigenous
students who struggle in school and the neglect of the
region’s infrastructure demonstrate the government’s lack
of support. This neglect, as well as broken promises such as
the agricultural experts example, has prevented the Ipeti
Emberá villagers from trusting the government. Sheppard
and Sherman (1998) state that a sense of obligation is the
appropriate mechanism with which to produce trust in deep
dependence relationships. However, a lack of this sense
of obligation, which is likely compounded by the cultural
differences, prevents trust from being established between
these two parties. As a result, the villagers attempted to
solve their problems without assistance from individuals
or institutions outside of the village. An inability to do this
contributed to the community’s financial, educational, and
other deficiencies. Consequently, the villagers require help
from a trustworthy outside party: Global Brigades.

Strategies of Cultivating and Maintaining
Deep Interdependence
An analysis of Sheppard and Sherman’s (1998) model
reveals that the relationship between Ipeti Emberá
and Global Brigades can be categorized as deep
interdependence. Ipeti Emberá depends on Global
Brigades for assistance that is not provided by the
Panamanian government. Global Brigades depends on the
villagers for insight into their problems and cooperation in
Global Brigades initiatives.
As discussed above, Sheppard and Sherman
(1998) state that the main risk associated with deep
interdependence is misanticipation: the risk that, without
detailed instructions, one party will be unable to anticipate
the needs or actions of the other party. The appropriate
trust production mechanism in a deep interdependence
relationship is internalization (Sheppard & Sherman,
1998). Time, proximity, shared strategizing, shared identity,
common incentives, and the negotiation of common values
are all important facilitators of internalization (Sheppard
& Sherman, 1998). Global Brigades and the community
establish trust and mitigate the risk of misanticipation by
utilizing many of these facilitators.
The first internalization facilitator used in this
relationship is shared strategizing. As mentioned above,
Global Brigades spends ample time evaluating and
communicating with a community before initiating
brigades. By strategizing with Ipeti Emberá leaders before
beginning any initiatives, GBB ensured it held the same
goals and expectations as the community members.
54

This was a crucial component of establishing trust and
preventing misanticipation. Additionally, once a brigade is
finished and the brigaders depart, Global Brigades limits
communication between villagers and brigaders. This
prevents brigaders from making promises that they may
not keep and effectively ensures that only GBB and the
villagers engage in strategizing. This policy is instrumental
in limiting misanticipation and maintaining trust with
community members.
The second and third internalization facilitators used
in this relationship are time and proximity. The in-country
Global Brigades staff communicates with villagers on a
weekly basis. This consistent attention shows villagers that
Global Brigades is dedicated and trustworthy. Additionally,
because the Global Brigades staff is located in the same
country as the community, they can physically visit the
community on a regular basis, further enhancing the
relationship between the community and Global Brigades.
When brigades take place, the Global Brigades staff serves
as translators and liaisons between villagers and brigaders,
further developing trust through time and proximity.
The fourth internalization facilitator used in this
relationship is negotiation of common values. This is a
clear function of the financial literacy workshops, which
are designed to teach financial literacy concepts to
the members of Ipeti Emberá by using personalized,
relevant discussions. Additionally, the negotiation of
common values is exemplified by the Credit and Savings
Cooperative. As mentioned above, the members of Ipeti
Emberá are committed to their culture, and one aspect
of this culture is spending money as soon as one earns
it. However, GBB understands the importance of saving
money and encourages community members to adopt
this value. The generous interest rate for savings at the
cooperative (1% per month) represents GBB’s attempt
to convince the community members to embrace
the organization’s values regarding saving. Moreover,
elected leaders of the Ipeti Emberá community manage
the cooperative and community members are able to
determine how the cooperative profits are used. This
indicates that the community members are empowered
to keep their own values through the same GBB initiative.
In this way, the Credit and Savings cooperative illustrates
the negotiation of shared values between GBB and the
members of Ipeti Emberá. This negotiation allows GBB
and villagers to adopt similar values, which increases trust
between these two parties.
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Strategies of Cultivating and Maintaining
Shallow Interdependence
There were essentially two different relationships involving
the authors’ team, each of which can be characterized
as shallow interdependence. The first relationship was
between the authors’ team and their financial literacy
workshop group. The second relationship was between
the authors’ team and Melania.
The relationship between the authors’ team and their
financial literacy workshop group can be characterized
by shallow interdependence. The team depended on the
villagers to pay attention and apply the concepts presented
to their own lives. If villagers did not do this, the team’s time,
money, and effort invested in the brigade would be in vain.
The villagers depended on the team for good instruction
that would improve their financial literacy, and thereby
improve their quality of life. Sheppard and Sherman (1998)
indicate that the appropriate trust production mechanism
in a shallow interdependence relationship is “active
discovery through communication and research.” The two
parties completed this active discovery throughout the
financial literacy workshops. For example, the icebreaker
that involved responding “yes” or “no” to statements of
personal interests enabled each party to learn about and
better understand the other. Additionally, when villagers
participated in workshops by describing their financial
experiences and situations, brigaders better understood
villagers and were able to tailor their lessons so they were
more useful. This was clearly illustrated by the woman who
followed the financial workshop teachings to save money
instead of purchasing a redundant hair clip. Her feedback
encouraged both the brigaders and other villagers that the
discovery from the workshop lesson was successful, and
consequently created trust between the two parties. The
“best friend” system also contributed to active discovery
between villagers and brigaders. Discussions between best
friends, facilitated by translators, encouraged a deeper level
of discovery that created trust on a personal level.
The relationship between the authors’ team
and Melania can also be characterized by shallow
interdependence. Team members depended on Melania
to give them accurate information concerning her
business, understand their suggestions, and implement
the recommendations after the brigade ended. Melania
relied on the team to give her good advice and to not
misuse the information that she provided. This relationship
is particularly interesting because trust was not established
until the very end of the brigade.

Trust was initially elusive in this particular relationship
for many reasons. As discussed above, the students
committed many cultural gaffes, such as entering
Melania’s home without gaining permission, neglecting
to remove their shoes in her home, beginning meetings
with business instead of culturally acceptable social
pleasantries, and inquiring about her ability to read
without establishing any kind of rapport. Factors that were
out of the team’s control also likely contributed to the
mistrust Melania felt toward the brigaders. These included
Melania being in a different financial literacy workshop
group and therefore not bonding with the students
through icebreakers, being paired with a different “best
friend,” and having a mentor who refused GBB business
consulting assistance.
As previously mentioned, the risks associated with
a shallow interdependence relationship are unreliability,
indiscretion, and poor coordination (Sheppard & Sherman,
1998). All three of these risks were realized before the team
was able to produce trust in the relationship. Unreliability
is the risk that one party will not behave as expected
(Sheppard & Sherman, 1998). This occurred multiple times
throughout the week as Melania withheld information
from the brigaders. For example, Melania stated that she
did not know if there were other pigs in the village. It is
very unlikely that Melania truly did not know, considering
the community has only 85 families, Melania had lived in
this community her entire life, and her son readily knew
the answer. Melania’s tendency to withhold information
was not malicious. She was clearly worried about the
second risk of shallow interdependence relationships,
indiscretion, in which one party will inappropriately utilize
or disclose sensitive information (Sheppard & Sherman,
1998). Melania’s consideration of this risk was explicitly
stated when she asked the team members if they were
posing so many questions because they intended to use
her information to begin a pig farm in the United States.
The final risk associated with shallow interdependence
relationships, poor coordination, is the risk that
coordination will not be rapid or effective enough to be
successful (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998). This was the risk
that brutally confronted the authors’ team at the end of
the week; the lack of trust in their relationship with Melania
made the possibility that she would refuse to cooperate
and ignore their suggestions very real.
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Team members utilized the trust production
mechanism for shallow interdependence relationships,
discovery through communication and research, to
establish trust at the end of their brigade. First, the team
improved their communication by beginning the final
meeting by speaking with Melania about her family
and culture, culturally appropriate topics and much
appreciated by Melania. Second, the team showed that
they had conducted sufficient research about Melania’s
culture by entering her home in the proper manner and
removing their shoes once they were inside. Similarly,
team members indicated that they had conducted
sufficient research regarding Melania’s business by
responding to her express desires. When the students
presented Melania with a recommendation, they told her
the amount of money she could gain if she followed their
recommendation. They then explained that this money
could be used to further her grandchildren’s education,
which was very important to her. Additionally, the team
responded to Melania’s desire for additional shelter for
her pig by buying the tarp and working with her family
to erect it. This active discovery began to produce
trust in the relationship, mitigating the risks of shallow
interdependence and facilitating a successful outcome of
the social entrepreneurship effort.

& Sherman, 1998). Coordination cannot be achieved
without the participation and contribution of each
party; consequently, both parties rely on each other to
achieve the success of the initiative in which they are
both invested. For this reason, it is very rare to find shallow
dependence relationships in social entrepreneurship.

Conclusion
Sheppard and Sherman (1998) believe their model of
trust can help users understand the form and depth
of a relationship, and thereby manage the trust and
associated risks within the relationship. In this article we
argue that this model can also be used to understand the
trust and associated risks of relationships within social
entrepreneurship initiatives. Although we acknowledge
the very narrow scope of our research, we are confident
that our experience in Panama is not unique; we
contend that trust is an essential component of social
entrepreneurship success. Nevertheless, more research
regarding trust and social entrepreneurship must be
completed in order to provide broad conclusions that
can be utilized by social entrepreneurs. It is our hope
and conviction that better understanding and enhanced
consideration of trust will enable social entrepreneurs to
achieve greater effectiveness and increased social impact.

The Absence of Shallow Dependence
Even though this case study analyzes multiple
relationships, it does not provide an example of shallow
dependence, the fourth form of trust discussed by
Sheppard and Sherman (1998). This gives a small
indication of the relevance of shallow dependence
relationships to social entrepreneurship. In general, social
entrepreneurship initiatives are not conducive to shallow
dependence relationships because each party is invested
in the success of the initiative. Social entrepreneurs are
motivated to begin initiatives because they seek social
change, social impact, or social transformation (Ebrashi,
2013). Volunteers and employees who take part in social
entrepreneurship efforts often have similar goals. Their
desire to make a difference causes them to be invested
in the outcome of their initiatives. Simultaneously, social
entrepreneurship initiatives are typically designed to
help or empower certain populations; members of these
populations are inherently invested in the outcome of
the initiatives. This shared investment makes one risk
very pertinent: poor coordination. Poor coordination, as
discussed earlier, is the risk that coordination will not be
rapid or effective enough to be successful (Sheppard
56
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